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THE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION CONTROVERSY
REGINA AUSTINt

This Article explores the controversy that has arisen concerning
the classification criteria used in the marketing, underwriting, and pricing of personal automobile and property insurance. Classification criteria are the factors insurance companies use to assign individual applicants to groups differing in riskiness for the purpose of determining
whether insurance will be sold to them, and, if so, at what cost and on
what terms. Age, sex, marital status, occupation, and place of residence
are typical of the factors considered by insurance companies in distributing their product and its costs. As the use of such criteria exemplifies,
the insurance classification process is tied to social stratification, the hierarchical grouping of individuals by status and role that is prevalent
throughout American society. Social stratification provides a mechanism
for allocating power, prestige, and material wealth among groups of
individuals united by common values and behavior patterns.
The classification of insureds by insurance companies is as vulnerable to attack as the hierarchical status grouping it parallels. The classCopyright0 1983 by Regina Austin
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1970, University of Rochester; J.D. 1973, University of Pennsylvania.
I wish to thank a host of friends for their assistance in the production of this Article, particularly Gary Bahena, Mary Carroll Huey, Joia Johnson, Peggy O'Donnell, Peggy Ulrich, and most
especially Jerry Frug. An earlier version of this Article was presented at a session of the University of Pennsylvania Law School Legal Studies Seminar.
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ification controvery is the product of the efforts of individuals and
groups seeking to avoid the consequences of social stratification as applied not only to the distribution of a particular good or service, but
also across a broad spectrum of society's activities. Thus, the controversy has included challenges to the use of sex as a criterion on which
to price automobile insurance.' Similarly, attacks have been launched
against the practice of denying property insurance to the residents of
racial or ethnic urban neighborhoods through a process of territorial
discrimination known as "redlining." 2
The classification controversy has primarily been the concern of
legislatures (including the United States Congress) and insurance regulatory authorities. The courts have acted in an ancillary role limited
largely to reviewing legislative or administrative reforms. Given this
context, it is understandable that arguments advanced in the controversy reflect the general regulatory debate about the extent to which the
law should structure the economic sphere so as to promote either free
competition, on the one hand, or social welfare on the other.
Although the arguments attacking and supporting the use of the
classification criteria are advanced in legal forums, they are not couched
in formalistic jargon. Common law and constitutional doctrinal rubrics,
and the terms of civil rights laws and insurance regulatory measures
are not of major significance. The rhetoric of the controversy has not
been filtered through and purified into legal discourse. Although the
principal arguments appear in the regulatory pronouncements of insurance commissioners, in the opinions of courts reviewing legislative and
regulatory actions, and in the reports of federal administrative bodies,
they are akin to the positions advanced by ordinary folks at congressional hearings or by community organizers in tracts written for citizens' groups attacking alleged discriminatory insurance practices. Insurance agents and company executives have offered competing
arguments possessing a similar nonlegalistic quality.
Perhaps because they are constructed of common language, the arguments rather clearly reflect the tensions and contradictions in the ideology that underlies them.' Most significantly, they reveal the strain
produced by the opposition of individual autonomy and intragroup solidarity. Moreover, the arguments inconsistently suggest that the classifi1 See, e.g., infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
• See infra text accompanying note 42; note 71 and accompanying text.
8 The analysis used in this Article relies predominantly upon R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. UNGER 1]; R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS (1975)
[hereinafter cited as R. UNGER II]. Two other works that are essential to the reasoning are Frug,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HAPV. L. REV. 105 (1980), and Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAIrv. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
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cation controversy can be solved either by an appeal to neutral principles supported by an apolitical consensus of values, or by the use of the
tactics and strategems of political conflict and resolution. Because these
tensions doom them to incoherence and disunity, no premise or argument presently being advanced provides a basis for resolving the
controversy.
Part I of this Article explores the origins of the controversy and its
legal context. Part II describes a few of the criteria insurance companies employ in classifying insureds and explains why classification and
social stratification generate controversy. Part III dissects the arguments
advanced by those seeking relief from the effects of the classification
practices of insurance companies and explains their inadequacy. Part
IV suggests that the classification controversy may be resolved and the
strictures of social stratification eased through the creation of communities capable of democratically generating a real consensus concerning
the distribution of insurance protection and its cost.
I.
A.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT

Insurance Company Practices

In preindustrial societies, a person viewed his family, neighbors,
voluntary associations, and traditional elites as sources of security
against the risk of fortuitous losses." In capitalistic industrialized societies a person need not rely on such traditional, custom-bound attachments; he can purchase security in the form of a product called insurance.5 Insurance is sold by corporate concerns that claim to employ
statistical techniques by which they turn the risk of individually unpredictable events into fixed premiums, assured benefits, and profits for the
concern's shareholders or employees.' Insurance companies have replaced traditional sources of security because the companies supposedly
perform more rationally and efficiently. Moreover, with industrialization, "[m]en no longer [have] personal relationships comprehensive...
7
or dependable enough, to provide

. . .

security."1

' See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A PreliminaryInquiry in the Theory
of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 479-80 (1961); see also M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 360-62 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978).
1' See Kimball, supra note 4, at 480; see also M. HORWM, THE TRANSFORMATION OF

AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 226-37 (1977).
4 See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 1.2(b)(2), (5) (1971).

7 Kimball, supra note 4, at 480. See also id. at 513. The destruction of the extended family
or kinship group has been laid to "industrial growth": "Mobile isolated units are more functional
in a capitalist economy, thus the ascendency of the nuclear family and the destruction of the social
framework of intra-familial 'social security."' Offe, Advanced Capitalismand the Welfare State, 2
POL. & SOC'Y 479, 482-83 (1972). In addition to replacing the family, insurance companies per-

520

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:517

Personal automobile and property insurance provide a form of security that most ordinary people wish to purchase.' Such coverage protects the insured, his family, his friends, and in the case of liability
insurance, strangers whom he may harm. Furthermore, an individual
may be required to procure coverage in order to obtain a car registration that will permit his automobile on the road9 or a governmentbacked mortgage that will finance the purchase of his home.1 0
Insurance companies, however, are unable or unwilling to meet
the full demand for personal automobile and property insurance. The
chief explanation for this is that company profitability is tied to the
selective acceptance and rejection of applicants for coverage." For example, automobile insurance premiums are assessed on the basis of
characteristics the insured shares with a class or group of insureds."
The class will generally consist of people of like age, sex, and marital
status who live or garage their cars in the same geographic territory
and make the same sort of use (pleasure, commuter, business, or farm)
of their vehicles. 8 Assume that the premium is fixed at the future average cost of insuring the class, as estimated according to suppositions
based on its past experience.1 4 To assure a profit and to keep its expoform what Theodore Lowi calls a "most unappreciated service": "we rely upon them to administer
our conflicts, with each other or with nature, rather than leave these to spontaneous confrontation
or traditional litigation." T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 29 (2d ed. 1979).
8 In 1981, consumers spent $24,395,174,000 in premiums for automobile liability insurance
and $16,747,789,000 for automobile physical damage insurance. See INSURANCE INFORMATION
INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS 22 (1982-83 ed.). Premium volume for multiple peril homeowners
insurance was $10,779,626,000. Id. at 23.
1 Automobile insurance may be required by either compulsory insurance statutes or financial
responsibility laws. Twenty-one states have mandatory insurance laws. Abramoff, Rating the Rating Schemes: Application of Constitutional Equal Protection Principlesto Automobile Insurance
Practices,9 CAP. U.L. REV. 683, 685 & n.11 (1980). Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia require that a driver furnish adequate proof of present security and future financial responsibility in the event of an automobile accident. Failure to provide such proof typically leads to
the loss of driving privileges. See Sheldon & Sarason, Auto Insurance Availability Issues-A Role
for Legal Services, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 825, 826, 838-39 (1982).
10 The Veterans Administration loan guaranty program requires property insurance, 38
C.F.R. § 36.4222 (1983), as does the low-cost and moderate-income mortgage insurance program,
24 C.F.R. § 221.521 (1982). See generally FEDERAL INS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., INSURANCE CRISIS IN URBAN AMERICA 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE CRISIS]; Carter, The Limits of Regulatory Powers of Insurance Commissioners-An Industry Viewpoint, 13 FORUM 403, 408 (1978).
" Fierce competition through selectivity and classification refinement began in the 1950's,
when insurers who employed bureau rates and sold their product through independent agents
were faced with competition from companies that calculate their premiums independently and sell
their insurance directly and more cheaply through employees. The bureau companies adopted
elaborate classification systems in order to offer lower rates to the preferred risks. COMPTROLLER
GEN. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULA
TION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 102-04 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
12 See STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATIONS IN PROPERTY
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 28-44 (1976) (Supplement) [hereinafter cited as SRI SUPP.].
s See infra notes 125-60 & 163-84 and accompanying text.
14 There are two methods for calculating auto insurance rates: the loss ratio method and the
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sure within the confines of the assumptions on which the premium is
based, an insurer will not accept all comers who fall into the class. 5
Instead it will seek to identify the above-average risks and reject some
or all of them through a process of risk assessment known as underwriting." Moreover, it will compete for the chance to insure as many
below-average risks as possible. Marketing strategies will be directed at
the better risks. Actuaries who formulate the premium categories and
the rates charged will do so in a way that gives more desirable risks an
attractive advantage.1 If the insurer succeeds in its efforts, the average
cost of insuring the class will decline. The insurer will then be even
more attractive to other below-average risks falling in the same category,1' and its profits will increase. Thus, within every rate class there
are some risks that are unacceptable because of competitive selectivity.
To meet the demand that is therefore not satisfied by the private
or voluntary market, both automobile and property insurance are sold
in a public or residual market. 9 The public market for each is a statutorily created mechanism conceived in response to political pressures
generated by the unavailability of coverage. These pressures were fueled, in the case of automobile insurance, by the enactment of financial
responsibility laws and compulsory insurance requirements2 0 and, in
the case of property insurance, by the insurance companies' near abandonment of urban markets (in favor of suburban markets) following the
introduction of the package of coverages known as homeowners insurance.21 Fearing restrictions on their profit-maximizing practices or
competition from rival state-run schemes subsidized by tax revenues,
insurance companies2 2 cooperated with regulatory officials in creating
pure premium method. The latter is closest to the illustration in the text. For a discussion of both,
see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 152-66 (1977). See
also H. DENENBERG, R. EILERS, J. MELONE, & R. ZELTEN, RISK AND INSURANCE 528-31 (2d ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as H. DENENBERG].
15 See Works, Whatever's FAIR-Adequacy, Equity and the Underwiting Prerogative in
Property Insurance Markets, 56 NEB. L. REV. 445, 455-69 (1977).
1s Id. at 464. The underwriting function includes more than acceptance or rejection of a risk.
See Head, Underwriting-in Five Easy Lessons?, 35 J. RISK & INS. 307 (1968). For inferior
risks, insurers can raise premiums, restrict policy provisions, require hazard controls, and reinsure. For superior risks, insurers can lower premiums, broaden coverage, remove policy restrictions, and retain a larger share of the risk. Id. at 308.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 101-04.
, See Works, supra note 15, at 464.
s See FEDERAL INS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. & URBAN DEv., FULL INSURANCE
AVAILABIITY 19-49 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FULL INSURANCE.].
20 D. REINMuTH & G. STONE, A STUDY OF ASSIGNED RISK PLANS 1-2 (1970).
2i Works, supra note 15, at 484-85; INSURANCE CRISIS, supra note 10, at 3-5.
22 Works, supra note 15, at 480-84. Not all plans have met with the acquiescence of the
insurance industry. See, e.g., California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S.
105 (1951) (rejecting constitutional attack on California law compelling participation in an assigned risk plan); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 400, 430 A.2d 174
(1981) (rejecting constitutional and statutory challenge to reinsurance facility implemented by in-
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what are now known as assigned risk plans and reinsurance facilities
for the undesirable automobile insurance risks2 3 and FAIR plans for
the undesirable property risks.2'
Insurance companies operate these public market mechanisms in
that they supply the personnel and expertise that run them.2" Because
they retain their right selectively to underwrite and reject risks
presented in the private market, insurance companies determine which
applicants will be required to purchase from the public mechanisms."6
surance commissioner). Cf. Prudential Property & Casualty Co. v. Insurance Comm'n of S.C.
Dep't of Ins., 534 F. Supp. 571 (D.S.C. 1982) (upholding loss-apportionment scheme for automobile reinsurance facility); American Ins. Ass'n v. Lewis, 50 N.Y.2d 617, 409 N.E.2d 828, 431
N.Y.S.2d 350 (1980) (successful constitutional attack on amended formula for allocating losses of
FAIR plan). In general, however, the industry accepts that it may be required to participate in
public-market insurance mechanisms, at least insofar as it has previously written voluntary-market policies for the same or similar coverages. See Carter, supra note 10, at 413.
" Automobile insurance residual mechanisms generally take one of three forms: an assigned
risk pool, a reinsuirance facility, or a joint underwriting association. The first assigned risk plan
was begun in New Hampshire in 1938, and eventually every state had such a plan. D. REINMUTH
& G. STONE, supranote 20, at 2. Under the assigned risk plans or automobile insurance plans, as
they are now known, undesirable rejected risks are randomly allocated among insurers in proportion to the amount of voluntary business each does in the state. G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM,
PERSONAL LINES UNDERWRITING 224-25 (1977). The individual insurer is totally responsible for
the losses of the risks assigned to it. Sheldon & Sarason, supra note 9, at 826-28.
In the early 1970's, a few states shifted to a mechanism known as a reinsurance facility. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-248.26 to .39 (1982). Under the facility approach, each insurer
accepts all applicants that request coverage and then cedes those risks it does not wish to retain to
a reinsurance pool, where the losses or profits attributable to the ceded risks are shared proportionately by all insurers. Lee & Formisano, Automobile Insurance Markets: Developments in the
Reinsurance Facility Technique, 624 INS. L.J. 9 (1975). The insured whose risk is ceded is
treated in every way like the insured whose risk is retained.
Other jurisdictions have chosen to create joint underwriting associations pursuant to which a
small number of insurers perform the marketing and servicing functions for all residual business,
while the losses of the association are shared proportionately by all insurers. Lee & Formisano,

Residual Markets in Automobile Insurance: The Service Center and the Joint UnderwritingAssodation Approaches, 625 INS. LJ. 92 (1975). See generally Lee & Formisano, Residual Markets
in Automobile Insurance:A ComparativeAnalysis, 626 INS. L.J. 143 (1975). The state of Maryland is alone in employing a state insurance fund as its residual market mechanism. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, §§ 243-243L (Supp. 1982).
" For property insurance, the statutory scheme is referred to as a "FAIR plan." "FAIR" is
an acronym for "Fair Access to Insurance Requirements." The FAIR plan program was created
under the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat.
555 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, & 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
States that enact FAIR plans meeting federal requirements are entitled to federal riot reinsurance.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1600.101 to .502 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1982-83); 31 PA.
ADMIN. CODE § 111.1 (Shepard's 1982). Only 26 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico presently maintain FAIR plans. See infra note 50; see also Comment, FAIR Plans: History,
Holtzman and the Arson-for-Profit Hazard,7 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 616 (1979).
" See Sheldon & Sarason, supra note 9, at 826; Comment, supra note 24, at 623-25. Consumer participants must comprise one-third of the members of the governing body of a FAIR
plan. Id. at 628-29.
" See British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 30 N.Y.2d 53, 281 N.E.2d 149, 330
N.Y.S.2d 340 (1972). In Stewart, the New York Superintendent of Insurance challenged the systematic program of seven insurance companies, comprising a single enterprise known as Royal
Globe Insurance Company, that reduced their voluntary-market exposure and thereby their proportionate share of the losses of the property insurance joint underwriting association. Royal
Globe had responded to the institution of the underwriting association by cancelling fire insurance
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The public markets provide less coverage at higher premiums and
'7
on worse terms than is generally provided by the private markets.
on commercial properties in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant, and thereby requiring the cancelled
insureds to turn to the association for coverage. The Superintendent issued a formal complaint
charging that, while the state insurance code did not prohibit underwriting based on legitimate
business reasons, the pattern pursued by Royal Globe violated the codes racial discrimination
proscriptions. The Court of Appeals rejected the Superintendent's argument and upheld the defendants' asserted prerogative to commit to the association any risks they chose, since the Superintendent had found that Royal Globe did not intend to discriminate against blacks. Requiring that
insureds resort to the association was not unlawful since the very purpose of the association was to
provide insurance for those to whom the industry was unwilling to issue policies on a voluntary
basis.
A similar concern about untrammeled discretion in ceding risks to an automobile reinsurance
facility prompted North Carolina's Insurance Commissioner to reject a 1971 rate filing that would
have permitted facility insureds to be charged 10% more than insureds retained in the voluntary
market. State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 422-23,
269 S.E.2d 547, 574 (1980). The Commissioner's primary objections to the filing arose from the
fact that the insurers' wholly unrestrained exercise of subjective judgment with respect to cessions
had resulted in a facility population of which 86.9% of the ceded exposures had not caused a claim
payment to be made, 71% had never been assessed driving code violation points, and 62.3% had
neither produced a claim nor been assessed points. Id. at 423, 269 S.E.2d at 574. The court, in
rejecting the Commissioner's findings as not being supported by substantial evidence, concluded
that under the legislative scheme establishing the reinsurance facility, insurance companies are
allowed "to cede any insured they elect not to retain without [regard to] any [objective] criteria
established by law." Id. at 434, 269 S.E.2d at 581. In the court's view, the fact that insurers are
not allowed to make a profit on facility business should sufliciently prevent abuse of the ceding
privilege. Id.
"TIn the case of residual market automobile insurance, almost all state plans limit coverage
in both dollar amount and type of coverage, although less so now than in the past. Typically, the
coverage was limited to the minimum requirements of compulsory insurance and financial responsibility laws. At present 43 states and the District of Columbia offer optional liability coverage of
at least $25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident and 510,000 for property damage. GAO RE.
PORT, supra note 11, at 150-54. All but six states also offer comprehensive and collision coverage
through their insurance plans. Id. Residual market plans commonly charge higher rates than the
voluntary markets. Id. at 155. Indeed, at least one court has steadfastly ruled that residual market
insureds are supposed to pay higher rates. State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina
Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 434, 269 S.E.2d 547, 580 (1980).
Property insurance coverage provided under FAIR plans is limited generally to fire and extended coverage, and vandalism and malicious mischief coverage. 44 C.F.R. § 55.3 (1982). States
may expand the coverage as they see fit. See, e.g., District of Columbia Ins. Placement Facility v.
Washington, 269 A.2d 45 (D.C. 1970) (superintendent empowered to require inclusion of crime
insurance in FAIR plan coverage though not specifically provided for in federal regulations). Illinois, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin offer full coverage through a homeowners-type
policy. DeWolfe, Squires, & DeWolfe, Civil Rights Implications of Insurance Redlining, 29
DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 318 n.26 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DeWolfe]. Upper limits on lines of
coverage exist in order to spare the FAIR program single large losses; it is also assumed that
owners of property of large values have sufficient market power to obtain other insurance. Works,
supra note 15, at 525 n.198. FAIR plan insureds also generally pay higher premiums than do
voluntary market insureds. Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 9 (1980). After the Holtzman Admendment, Pub. L. No. 95-557,
92 Stat. 2097 (1978) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3 (Supp. V- 1981)), prohibited this practice,
several states with FAIR plans chose to forego federal riot reinsurance rather than comply.
Badain, supra, at 32. See also infra note 50. FAIR plan insureds also receive slower claims service
and are usually denied a premium payment plan. Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders-Discriminationby Propertyand Casualty Insurance Companies: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Citizens and ShareholdersRights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91, 650-51 (1978) (statement of James Katz, Research Director, Mass. Fair
Share) [hereinafter cited as Rights and Remedies].
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FAIR plan applicants, for example, can be subjected to inspections that
may result in premium surcharges; voluntary market applicants whose
properties pose similar risks are generally not surcharged, because their
properties are not inspected.2" FAIR plan insureds are sometimes subjected to special procedural burdens,2" such as a condition that payment
must be by certified check or coverage will become effective only after
the check has cleared.30 Moreover, agency outlets are not conveniently,
located in areas where public market insureds are concentrated. 1 Because of these disparities, some insureds prefer to procure coverage
through nonstandard carriers rather than through a public market
mechanism. 2 Others forego coverage entirely.
The creation of the public markets did not solve the problem of
competitive selectivity; rather, their existence exacerbated it,"3 in that
insurance companies became better able to resort to underwriting" as a
defense against the political uncertainties of the rate approval process.3 5
See INSURANCE CRISIS, supra note 10, at 20-21.
1 See Badain, supra note 27, at 9-10; see also J. Sheldon & E. Sarason, Automobile Insurance "Subsidies," Related Current Legislative Issues 68-70 (May 1981) (available through Research Institute on Legal Assistance, Legal Services Corp.).
30 Badain, supra note 27, at 9 n.45.
3' Abramoff, supra note 9, at 703-04 n.86 (citing L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 8); See
R. SCHACHTER, INSURANCE REDLINING-ORGANIZING TO WIN 12 (1981) (published by National

Training and Information Center, Chicago, Ill.). Several states have enacted laws restricting a
company's ability to withdraw from territories through the cancellation of agency agreements. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-940(2) (Law. Co-op. 1977); see also Rowell v. Harleysville Mut.
Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 108, 250 S.E.2d 111 (1978) (upholding constitutionality of South Carolina
provision in an injunction action); G-H Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 270 S.C. 147, 241
S.E.2d 534 (1978) (private cause of action brought by agent permitted). But see Garris v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1980) (retroactive application of South Carolina statute in
wrongful termination action violates the contract clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1). Insurance
agents have a strong incentive to select risks conservatively because companies rely on loss ratios in
deciding whether agents are "unprofitable" and should be terminated. See Andrew J. Corsa &
Son, Inc. v. Harnett, 92 Misc. 2d 569, 400 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (agent unsuccessfully
sues to establish right to reject risks in order to avoid company termination); see also G. KEENAN,
INSURANCE REDLINING: PROFITS VS. POLICYHOLDERS 10 (1978) (published by National Training
and Information Center, Chicago, Ill.).
33 FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 48. Unfortunately, some of these insureds procure
insurance from companies that become insolvent. Id.
33 See FULL INSURANCE,,supra note 19, at 26; GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 96; G. KEENAN, supra note 31, at 37.
" As one commentator notes: "Obviously, the bottom line of any business is profit. It is
inevitable that as rates prove inadequate . . . underwriting restrictions will be increased [and]
. . . insureds will encounter [more difficulty] in obtaining suitable coverages." Carter, supra note
10, at 409. See also Works, supra note 15, at 458. The industry acknowledges the attractiveness of
underwriting as a means to combat regulatory restrictions. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at
96.
3 An alternative to "dumping" risks in the residual markets is avoiding any business within
a state by withdrawing entirely. Carter, supra note 10, at 409. See also Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Commissioner of Ins., 372 Mass. 554, 363 N.E.2d 1087 (1977) (license suspension proceeding
based on statutory amendment barring withdrawal except when solvency is jeopardized); Sheeran
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 548, 404 A.2d 625 (1979) (automobile insurers withdrawing by cancelling all policies must surrender license to do business in state); People ex rel. Lewis
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In jurisdictions that regulate rates," insurance commissioners have examined requests for rate increases more closely in the wake of public
outcry against the rising cost of essential personal insurance. Increases
have been denied, 7 delayed, 8 and reduced. 9 The result is that insurers
have "dumped" the least desirable risks into the public market.'0
Young males are especially likely to wind up in the automobile assigned risk pools,' 1 and the private market has been entirely foreclosed
v. Safeco Ins. Co., 98 Misc. 2d 856, 414 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (insurer may not be denied
right to terminate business by surrendering license).
" Although all states except Illinois currently exercise some regulatory control over rates,
one-third permit free competition among insurers to determine the rates, so long as the resulting
rates are not "excessive," "inadequate," or "unfairly discriminatory." GAO REPORT, supra note
11, at 60. Approximately two-thirds of the states, plus the District of Columbia, require insurers
to use state-made rates or to obtain prior approval of their rate changes before using them. Id. at
59-68.
" Appeal of Nationwide Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 90, 411 A.2d 1107 (1980) (affirming the denial
of a request for a 14% increase when a 15% increase had been approved only three weeks before
request was made); Insurance Servs. Office v. Whaland, 117 N.H. 712, 378 A.2d 743 (1977)
(dismissing appeal from denial of a 14.4% rate increase for homeowners insurance); Pack v.
Royal-Globe Ins. Cos., 224 Tenn. 452, 457 S.W.2d 19 (1970) (reversing order of trial court
approving a 25% increase denied by the commissioner). CF In re Allstate Ins. Co., 179 N.J.
Super. 581, 432 A.2d 1366 (1981) (insurer with independently filed rateswho subsequently subscribed to rating bureau barred from using higher bureau rates without commissioner's approval).
But see State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 474, 269
S.E.2d 595 (1980) (vacating order denying a 9.1% increase in homeowners insurance rates); State
ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 538
(1980) (nullifying commissioner's denial of requested 5.6% increase in automobile insurance
rates); State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269
S.E.2d 547 (1980) (overturning commissioner's denial of an increase of 6%, the maximum allowed
by statute); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Knutson, 278 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1979) (commissioner's denial of
requested 18.9% automobile insurance rate increase reversed).
For a response to the industry's claim that there has been substantial disapproval of rates, see
G. KEENAN, supra note 31, at 52-53, arguing that the number of applications and the limited
resources of the insurance regulatory body lead to rubber stamping. See also GAO REPORT, supra
note 11, at 65-66 (noting that most rate filings are approved with no modifications). The GAO
found, however, that the majority of private passenger automobile insurance rate requests were
modified, with the reductions averaging 3.7%. Id.
" GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 68; Carter, supra note 10, at 406-07.
11 See, e.g., State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office,
287 N.C. 192, 214 S.E.2d 98 (1975) (insurance commissioner reduced automobile insurance rates
because of the effect of "energy crisis" on amount of driving; court reversed on grounds commissioner had no authority to enter order); Department of Ins. v. Teachers Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 735
(Fla. 1981) (upholding retroactive application of 1980 amendmet mandating return of excess
profits realized by automobile insurers in violation of 1977 statute); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 372 N.E.2d 520 (1978) (statute ordering retroactive
reduction and rebate of automobile premiums held constitutional).
40 See supra note 26. The statistic most frequently cited by critics to support their claim of
"dumping" is the large number of risks found in the public mechanisms who have caused no
claims to be made. FAIR plans are also alleged to be replete with "clean risks." Badain, supra
note 27, at 11 (only 4.8% of FAIR insureds have suffered any losses).
" According to an industry study examining over three million insurance policies written by
participating insurers in 12 states (including California, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania) during the second quarter of 1978, "[s]ingle male principal operators under age 25
accounted for 16 percent of the shared market policies, versus 5 percent of their regular market
policies. . . .Young male non-principal operators.., represented 6 percent of the shared market policies, compared with 4 percent of the regular market policies." ALL-INDUSTRY RESOURCE
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to the residents of certain geographic areas. (The latter practice is
known as "redlining" because insurers commonly used red markings on
maps to delimit territories whose residents were not considered desirable risks.)

42

Nonetheless, forcing large numbers of risks into the public markets
has not sheltered company profits. 43 Year after year the premiums
44
charged public market insureds are insufficient to cover their losses,
which are absorbed by insurers.45 Subsequent rates for public market
insureds do not fully reflect the adverse experience; part of the cost is
passed along to private market insureds in order to keep public market
rates affordable. Insurance companies contend that this subsidization
produces overinsurance by poor residual market risks and underinsurance by good voluntary market risks.46
B.

Efforts at Reform

The dual system of distribution and the expanded role of competitive selectivity have provoked a legal and political controversy. Because
the conflict is being waged in the legislative, regulatory, and judicial
bodies of so many jurisdictions, it is impossible to catalogue the constantly fluctuating successes and failures of those who are challenging
insurance company competitive classification practices. The reforms the
challengers seek are of two sorts: they either mitigate the effects of company selection practices, or they directly limit the ability of insurance
companies to differentiate among insureds in underwriting and rating.
Despite a great deal of argumentation and analysis, the legislative and
regulatory changes have been limited in effect and court victories have
been few in number.
Residual market insureds complain about the limited coverage
ADVISORY COUNCIL, THE COST OF AUTO INSURANCE 12 (1980).
42 INSURANCE CRISIS, supra note 10, at 27. See also ILLINOIS, IND., MICH., MINN., OHIO,
AND WIS. ADVISORY COMMS. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INSURANCE REDLINING:

FACT NOT FICTION 4-5 (1979) (defining redlining as "cancelling, refusing to insure or to renew,
or varying the terms under which insurance is available to individuals because of the geographic
location of a risk") [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT].

,' Under FAIR plans, limited reinsurance is available to cover some of the insurers' losses.
Comment, supra note 24, at 631-32.
4" For the first quarter of 1982, FAIR plan underwriting losses nationwide totalled $19.4
million. NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Prop. & Casualty Ins. ed.), Nov. 19, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
45 Comment, supra note 24, at 632-33. In most states, the FAIR plan is an association of
companies writing insurance. All profits, losses, and expenses are divided based on market share in
a particular line of insurance. For example, a company writing 10% of fire insurance in the
voluntary market would pay 10% of the losses and expenses accrued through fire insurance in the
residual market and receive 10% of any profits. G. KEENAN, supra note 31, at 36.
"' See Pauly, The Welfare Economics of Community Rating, 37 J. RISK & INS. 407, 408-11
(1970).

1983]

INSURANCE

they receive and the higher rates they are charged relative to the coverage and rates available in the voluntary market.47 One response to such
complaints has been expanded coverage and caps on premiums. Special
policies have been created to cover older residential properties that are
uninsurable because their repair or replacement costs, the usual basis
on which losses are assessed, far exceed their fair market values.4 8 The
Holtzman Amendment4 9 provides for the equalization of FAIR plan
and private market premiums, but it has had a limited effect because
eleven jurisdictions have opted to forego the benefit of the federal crime
reinsurance that is available when FAIR plans conform to federal requirements rather than permit the subsidization of FAIR plan
insureds.5 0
A few jurisdictions have enacted laws that limit the differential
between private and public market premiums for automobile insurance.51' Legislators have also statutorily restricted total automobile premium charges. 52 In some jurisdictions insurers' income from investments-a source of revenue that is not traditionally considered in
premium calculations-is explicitly treated as a cushion protecting insurers from actual loss in the face of adverse underwriting experience. 58
47 See supra note 27.
4S See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2104(2) (West Supp. 1980-81) (repair cost
policy); id. § 500.2104(3) (replacement cost policy); see also Ninety Day Report of the Advisory
Committee to the NAIC Redlining Task Force, 2 NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS PROC. 515, 522-23
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Ninety Day Report].
49 Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2097 (1978) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3) (Supp. V.

1981).
'o California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Lousiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon,
Puerto Rico, and Virginia elected to forego federal riot reinsurance rather than comply with the
Holtzman Amendment. Badain, supra note 27, at 32. See also FEBRUARY 1980 SEMINAR ON INSURANCE REGULATION AND PUBLIC CONCERNS, 1980 CONF. INS. LEGISLATORS PROC.] 25-31 (discussion of the merits of foregoing federal riot reinsurance) [hereinafter cited as COIL PROC.]. The
only jurisdictions that remained in the program after the Amendment's enactment were those that
had prohibited higher premiums on policies written through the FAIR plan prior to its passage.
Comment, supra note 24, at 634. See also Works, supra note 15, at 507-12. The Amendments
potential impact was further restricted when two major insurers-Allstate and the Continental
Insurance Group-chose not to participate in FAIR plans in any state where participation was
not required. Id. at 511 & n.60. As voluntary participation among other insurers also began to
decline, participation became mandatory in all but two of the states where the programs were
operating. Id. at 511-12.
51 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 113H (Michie/Law Coop. Supp. 1983); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2930 (West Supp. 1980-81); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.26 (1982) (rate
increase tied to Consumer Price Index).
a See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 113H (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1983).
s See Massachusetts Auto Rating & Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins.,
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1893, 424 N.E.2d 1127; Massachusetts Auto Rating & Accident Prevention
Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 Mass. 592, 411 N.E.2d 762 (1980) (remanding for use of
realistic income data in calculation of negative underwriting profit); Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 370 Mass. 791, 353 N.E.2d 745 (1976); see also Oklahoma State AFL-CIO v. State
Bd. for Property & Casualty Rates, 463 P.2d 693 (Okla. 1970) (ordering that consideration be
given to investment income); Virginia State AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 776, 167
S.E.2d 322 (1969) (ordering consideration of investment income earned on loss reserves as well as
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These measures limit somewhat the burden that would otherwise be
heaped on the victims of competitive selectivity.
Public market insureds and those unable to afford any coverage
are also demanding restrictions on the practices that have denied them
access to the voluntary market. The result is a direct assault upon competitive selectivity. Joining in the attack are private market insureds
who pay higher rates because of the use of the same or similar grouping criteria and practices."
A few of the efforts at direct reform will be discussed in detail
because they supply many of the arguments that are analyzed in the
third part of this Article. "5 In several jurisdictions, legislation prohibits
automobile insurance rating based on catgegories such as sex, age, or
marital status. 56 In a few states, regulators have attempted to achieve
the same result by exercising their general authority, but these efforts
have not been uniformly successful. 5" In Pennsylvania, the Commissioner issued an order disapproving a rating plan that charged men
higher premiums than similarly situated women. 8 The company whose
rating plan was rejected appealed the order on the ground that the
Commissioner had exceeded his authority, but the challenge was rejected by the Commonwealth Court which concluded that the Commissioner had justifiably relied on "nonactuarial" considerations such as
on earned premium reserves). But see State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate
Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 538 (1980) (finding error in commissioner's consideration of
income from invested capital and use of Massachusetts "capital asset" pricing model for calculating underwriting profit); State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300
N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547 (1980) (same holding as to 1977 automobile rate filing); State cx rel.
Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 474, 269 S.E.2d 595 (1980)
(same holding as to 1978 homeowner's rate filing). For criticism of the limited consideration given
investment income in automobile and property insurance rating, see R. HUNTER, INVESTMENT
INCOME IN RATEMAKING (National Insurance Consumer Organization Study No. 1, 1980).
" For example, the California Action League (CAL) has devised a platform to increase
consumer awareness of industry practices. The platform advocates the public disclosure of rating
manuals, the advertising of premiums, and the adoption of consumer "fair hearing" procedures.
Ultimately, CAL wants auto insurance rating to be assessed on driving record only. See Fisher,
Insurance Consumer Watchdog Group Formed NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Prop. & Casualty Ins.
ed.), Oct. 10, 1980, at 35, col. 1; Haggerty, California Citizens' Group Focuses on Auto Rcdlining, id., Aug. 22, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
" See infra text accompanying notes 207-370.
"See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 113B (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1982); Act of
Apr. 19, 1983, ch. 531, 1983 MONT. ADV. SESS. LAWS 2,319 (CCH); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30.3
(1982). See also GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 131-33. There has been legislative activity at the
federal level, but it has not yet resulted in a change in the law. Similar bills now before Congress,
however, would prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin in the
writing and selling of insurance contracts. Fair Insurance Practices Act, S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
"' Regulators in Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Wyoming have failed in their attempt
to ban sex as a rating criterion. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1982, at D2, col. 1.
" See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 65 Pa. Commw. 249, 442
A.2d 382 (1982).
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the fact that "men were not inherently worse drivers than women" and
that the male gender criterion was a proxy for driving while under the
influence of alcohol or during rush hour.5 Implementation of the ban
on the use of sex as a rating criterion has been suspended pending the
outcome of a further appeal of the case."0
Similar arguments failed to impress the courts of Louisiana."' The
Commissioner in that state ordered a group of insurers to abandon an
automobile insurance rating plan using age and sex as criteria. Claiming authority under the Insurance Code of Louisiana,"2 the Commissioner alleged violations of the statutory requirement that insurance
rates not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." The
Commissioner argued "that a rate structure based on age and sex, factors over which the driver has no control, unfairly discriminates against
those individuals with good driving records who are forced to pay
higher premiums because of membership in a class with a poor driving
record."" The court disagreed; because the evidence indicated a "sound
statistical basis" for the scheme, it did not discriminate unfairly."5 The
court relied on uncontradicted proof that "drivers under age 25 constitute 26% of the driver population and have 38% of the accidents; that
women drivers have fewer accidents than male drivers; and that drivers
over 65 have a smaller incidence of accident than do other drivers." 68
In New Jersey, the setback occurred quite differently. The Department of Insurance, under the direction of former Commissioner
James J. Sheeran, held hearings on the subject of automobile classifications and rendered a huge report.67 The Commissioner ordered modifications in company practices that included the elimination of age, sex,
and marital status as rating criteria. The insurance companies appealed
the order, however, and a stay was granted pending a decision by the
superior court. The order has not gone into effect6 ' and probably never
Id. at 256, 442 A.2d at 386.
11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 452 (1981).
*, See Insurance Servs. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
"

"

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1215 (West 1950).
Id. §§ 22:1402, 22:1404(2).
, 381 So. 2d at 516-17.
' Id. at 517.
" Id. at 516.
' NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF INS., HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS AND
RELATED METHODOLOGIES: FINAL DETERMINATION-ANALYSES AND REPORT (1981) [hereinafter
cited as N. J. REPORT].
" Letter from John J. Hayden to Regina Austin (Nov. 16, 1982) (discussing appeal). The
New Jersey legislature recently enacted a law providing that every senior citizen will receive the
benefit of at least a five percent reduction in automobile insurance rates. See New Jersey Automobile Insurance Reform Act, ch. 65, 1982 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 386 (West) (to be codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:29A).
62
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will because of the position of the present state administration."9
Direct attacks on insurance classifications have occasionally been
pressed in the courts, although the available doctrinal rubrics are somewhat anemic. Automobile rating territorial boundaries"' and property
insurance redlining practices7 1 have been challenged under the United
States Constitution and under various federal civil rights laws on the
grounds that they are racially discriminatory; these challenges have yet
to produce a favorable ruling on the merits. Equal protection and equal
rights provisions might be useful in challenging the use of age, sex, or
marital status as automobile rating criteria, were it not for the impediment of the state action doctrine.72 Claimants who are the victims of
conspiracies that restrict the availability of insurance may possibly have
a cause of action under the boycott prohibitions of the Sherman Act73
which are expressly excepted from the exemption of the insurance business from federal regulation found in the McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945.74
4, See N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1982, § 1, at 49, col. 1-2.
70 See County of Los Angeles v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 132 Cal. App. 3d 77, 182 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1982) (challenge to use of territory rating in automobile insurance dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies).
1 Among the civil rights laws upon which insurance redlining claims have been asserted is
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII). 42 U.S.C. §§ 3061-3631 (1976 & Supp. 111978). See
generally Comment, Application of Title VIII to Insurance Redlining, 75 NW. U.L. REV. 472
(1980). Title VIII prohibits practices that make unavailable or deny housing to persons because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and has been held to reach "every practice which has
the effect of making housing more difficult to obtain on prohibited grounds," United States v. City
of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980), including insurance redlining. Dunn v.
Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Casualty Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979). See
also Dunn v. Midwestern Indem., 88 F.R.D. 191 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (granting plaintiff's motion
for discovery of insurer's computer programs, system, and tapes).
Sections 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 might also be
invoked. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 (1976). See Badain, supra note 27, at 37-38 n.205;
DeWolfe, supra note 27, at 327-35; see also Prospect Area Hous. Dev. Fund Co. v. Schenck, 71
Misc. 2d 931, 337 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (unsuccessful equal protection challenge to geographic exclusion produced by the property insurance residual market mechanism).
71 See, e.g., Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 282 Pa. Super. 244, 422 A.2d 1097
(1980) (suit against automobile insurers alleging unlawful discrimination against males under the
Pennsylvania equal rights amendment fails for lack of state action), But see Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 65 Pa. Commw. 249, 255, 442 A.2d 382, 384 (1982) (distinguishing Murphy on grounds that in that case the Commissioner had not "positive[ly] exercise[d]
his authority under the statute . . . to disapprove rating schemes").
For commentary on equal protection challenges and the problems encountered when invoking
the clause, see generally DeWolfe, supra note 27, at 340-49. The obstacle presented by the state
action doctrine arises primarily from Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974),
which holds that even extensive regulation of a business's activities does not convert its conduct
into state action. Some commentators argue that Jackson should not bar suits against insurance
carriers. See, e.g., Kesner, Auto Insurance Rating: A Question of Equal Protection, 32 FED'N INS.
COUNCIL Q. 165, 168-69 (1982); Comment, Gender Classificationsin the Insurance Industry, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1381, 1394-95 (1975).
73 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438
U.S. 531 (1978) (insurers unlawfully conspired to reduce the availability of medical malpractice
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Procedural due process did, however, provide one notable court
victory for claimants attacking the automobile insurance classification
process in general. In Shavers v. Kelley , the Michigan Supreme
Court ruled that the state's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act was
"unconstitutionally deficient in its mechanisms for assuring that compulsory no-fault insurance is available to Michigan motorists at fair
and equitable rates."17 6 State action was not a problem for the Shavers
court: because the Act requires all registrants and operators of motor
vehicles to maintain personal injury, property damage, and residual liability insurance, "[iln effect, insurance companies are the instruments
through which the Legislature carries out a scheme of general welfare."7 7 The court went on to find a constitutional entitlement to the
availability of no-fault insurance on a fair and equitable basis. A
driver's license represents constitutionally protected property.7 8 Because
use of that property is dependent upon the registration of an automobile, which is in turn dependent upon the availability of state-mandated
insurance, the court concluded that a motorist has a protected property
interest in the availability of insurance "at fair and equitable rates."7 9
The deficiencies that the court identified in the Michigan scheme
included several aspects of the statutory assigned risk mechanism:
[A]lthough no-fault insurance may be available, motorists can be refused no-fault insurance or have their insurance
cancelled without effective legal redress for challenging refusal or discriminatory cancellation. Furthermore, motorists
can be placed into the "Automobile Placement Facility"
without an assurance of fair and equitable rates, without an
opportunity to obtain the same variety of coverage options,
insurance). The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that federal antitrust law does not generally
apply to insurance activity that is regulated by state law, but it leaves federal law applicable to
"boycotts, coercion or intimidation." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012, 1013(b) (1976). SeegenerallyGregory &
Levin, Boycotts and the McCarran-FergusonAct: Some Observations About Barry, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1087 (1977); Note, Developing a Consumer Right to Invoke the Boycott Exception to
the Insurance Company Exemption from FederalAntitrust Laws, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353
(1978); Antitrust Law-Insurance-PolicyholdersMay Maintain Sherman Act Antitrust Suit
Against Insurer Under Boycott Exception of McCarran-FegusonAct, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 490
(1978).
75 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978) (reported as Shavers v. Attorney Generalin official
reporter, but commonly referred to as Shavers v. Kelley). See also Epstein, Automobile No Fault
Plans: A Second Look at First Principles, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 769, 790 (1980); Insurance-No Fault-MichiganSupreme Court Finds No Fault Automobile Insurance Act Violative
of Due Process, 9 CUM. L. REV. 909 (1979).
76 402 Mich. at 581, 267 N.W.2d at 78.
77 Id. at 597, 267 N.W.2d at 86.
78 Id. at 599, 267 N.W.2d at 87. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
79 402 Mich. at 600, 267 N.W.2d at 87. The court relied on both the federal and state
constitutions. Id.
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and without a right to challenge such placement."0
Shavers did not involve an appeal from a regulatory order, but the
court had available and quoted from a comprehensive report by the
state Commissioner of Insurance entitled EssentialInsurance in Michi1 Significantly, the Commissioner had taken
gan: An Aviodable Crisis."
the position that the "'present system of regulation and the mechanisms for guaranteeing availablilty are seriously deficient.' "812 The
minimum that due process required, in the view of the Shavers court,
was:
(a) legislative or administrative elaboration of the statutory
rating standard that "rates shall not be excessive, inadequate
or unfairly discriminatory";
(b) rate filings that specify a base rate for the coverage, criteria properly considered by the insurer in.differentiating
premiums charged individual insureds, and the increment to
the base rate associated with each appropriate rating
criterion;
(c) publication of rates so that individuals can calculate
their premiums; and
(d) mechanisms for the prompt administrative review of individual premium calculation, declination, and cancellation
decisions. 8
Perhaps because the decision is inventive in its doctrinal manipulations and because it was rendered at a unique time and place, in
which the political climate was ripe for reform, it has not been duplicated in any other jurisdiction. The court created a constitutional right
that a service or product supplied by a private concern be made available at fair and equitable rates. In doing so, it treated the private insurance mechanism as an arm of the state, and ignored the legislative intent to permit the private mechanism to function on a competitively
selective basis while the socialized mechanism of the facility assured the
availability of limited coverage. Rejecting competition as a sufficient explanation, the court required that individuals be given reasons for premium charges and unfavorable actions. There was, however, no finding
that competition was not working and no facts on the record apart from
80Id. at 604-05, 267 N.W.2d at 89-90.

"1 INSURANCE BUREAU, MICH. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ESSENTIAL INSURANCE IN MICHIGAN:

AN AVOIDABLE CRISIS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ESSENTIAL INSURANCE].
82 402 Mich. at 605 n.28, 267 N.W.2d at 90 n.28 (quoting Commissioner's letter to the
Governor).
" Id. at 607-08, 267 N.W.2d at 91.
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the Commissioner's report to support the conclusion that regulation
was ineffective.
The Commissioner's report, which was directed toward legislative
reform, identified a guaranteed right to insurance and the assurance of
fair and competitive prices as two regulatory objectives."' The Shavers
court turned these objectives into a constitutional right. The first objective had a statutory basis; the second, which would restrict competitive
selectivity, collided with the statutory endorsement of the use of any
classification criteria which, in the court's paraphrasing of the language, "may measure any differences among risks that may have a
probable effect.upon losses or expenses." 5 The court cleverly took a
regulatory problem and elevated it to the status of a constitutional violation. Similarly, a regulatory solution became a constitutional
mandate.
The Michigan Supreme Court delayed the effectiveness of its ruling in order to give the legislature time to remedy the constitutional
deficiencies in the no-fault law. The legislature responded with the passage of the Essential Insurance Law of 1980,6 which enacted reforms
for both personal automobile and property insurance, including specified underwriting criteria, 7 limitations on the numbers of territories
into which the state may be divided and on the differential in premium
charges among them, 8 and requirements for explanations of declinations"9 and terminations.9 0
The efforts at reform, briefly outlined above, and the controversy
that produced them are not made of whole cloth. The problems with
which the insurance claimants, companies, regulators, and legislators
are wrestling have their origins in the process by which insurance companies create and apply classifications and thereby determine who is a
desirable insured and who is not. That process is linked to social stratification. Part II of this Article explores this linkage by discussing a few
of the most controversial criteria insurance companies use in classifying
applicants for insurance. Part III analyzes the weaknesses of the arguments advanced in support of the reforms.
SESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 81, at 25.
" 402 Mich. at 602, 267 N.W.2d at 88 (emphasis in original).
- MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.2109-.3385 (Supp. 1982-83).
87 Id. §§ 2111, 2117, 2118, 2119.
Id. § 2111(13).
' Id. § 2122.
" Id. § 2123.
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INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Insurance companies classify or group individual applicants ostensibly according to assumptions concerning their riskiness, that is, the
likelihood that they will incur future loss. In the companies' view, differentiating between high-risk groups who should pay more and lowrisk groups who should pay less is essential to profitability. 1 The companies' assumptions concerning how individuals should be grouped in
terms of variations in risk and how these groups should be underwritten and rated are tied to assumptions that are generally held and invoked in other situations where distribution decisions must be made or
justified. 92 However much the companies plead happenstance, insurance "risk" classifications correlate with a fairly simplistic and static
notion of social stratification that is familiar to everyone.93
In order to assess risk it is necessary to focus upon the behavior of
some existing group of individuals possessing a common trait. The
companies utilize commonly recognized social status groups.9 4
A status group is a community of individuals who are united by a
distinctive common life style that provides the basis on which they are
socially evaluated and hierarclically ranked.9 5 Social status "is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life is
expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle."9 6 As a result,
every status group requires that its members fulfill a number of roles'
in accord with a shared set of values and norms that dictate and obligate a common pattern of role behavior.9" Group members are gener91 NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF INS., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE CLASSIFICATION: AN OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND REMEDIES 7-8 (1981) [hereinafter cited as N.J. OVER.
VIEW]; STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATIONS IN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE 3 (1976) (Executive Summary Report) [hereinafter cited as SRI EXEC.
SUMMARY]. See also supra text accompanying notes 11-18.
For example, it has been argued that "bias" plays a role in the clasification process:
Although the core concern of the underwriter is the human characteristics of the
risk, cheap screening indicators are adopted as surrogates for solid information
about the attitudes and values of the prospective insured .... The invitations to
underwriters to introduce prejudgments and biases and to indulge amateur psychological stereotypes are apparent. Even generalized underwriting texts include occupational, ethnic, racial, geographic, and cultural characterizations certain to give
offense if publicly stated.
Works, supra note 15, at 471 (footnote omitted).
,s Recognition of the correlation between the classification practices of insurance companies
and the status grouping in which society at large engages is the significant contribution of the
analysis of automobile insurance classifications conducted by the New Jersey Department of Insurance under former Commissioner James J. Sheeran. See N.J. REPORT, supra note 67.
" Id. at 46.
" M. WEBER, supra note 4, at 305-06.
Id. at 932 (emphasis in original).
': R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 423 (1968 ed.).
R. NISBET & R. PERRIN, THE SOCIAL BOND 139-42 (2d ed. 1977).
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ally socialized to emulate a normative model or ideal type that also
provides a reference point for self-evaluation. It should be noted that
every person belongs to several status groups at the same time, each
status group involving its own roles, norms, values, and ideal types."
The correlation between status group membership and behavior
patterns mandated by a scheme of values makes status-group membership a useful factor in predicting the likelihood that an applicant for
insurance, be it automobile or property insurance, will engage in certain kinds of conduct that relate to the risk of accidents or loss.
Social status also carries with it access to (or the denial of) honor,
prestige, power, privilege, and economic goods and opportunities.1 00 Insurance compahies' (and their bureaucratic decisionmakers') perceptions of a group's riskiness mirror society's perceptions of a group's
possession of and entitlement to shares of the rewards and benefits
available for distribution. For example, marketing analysts, charged
with deciding what sort of customers would be most profitably insured
by their companies, are particularly interested in people with multiple
insurance needs.101 People who have boats as well as cars, or several
cars, or summer homes in addition to permanent residences, are attractive customers. Because status groups generate and reflect these consumption patterns, they are important to marketing analysts and actuaries.10 2 The company's sales force, whether in-house solicitors or
independent agents, will be located in areas populated by or accessible
to the more desirable customers.1 03 Marketing analysts promulgate
guidelines describing the desirable groups in order to aid underwriters
who have the primary task of accepting or rejecting applicants. Moreover, the competition also influences the allocation of the total cost of
automobile insurance among the various rating groups. °4 Thus, the
customers who are the most desirable from a competitive marketing
standpoint are more likely to be underwritten and rated as good risks.
These links between insurance classifications and social stratification are supported by an analysis of three grouping criteria employed
in personal automobile and property insurance risk assessment: occupation; age, sex, and marital status; and territory.
R. MERTON, supra note 97, at 423-24.
M. WEBER, supra note 4, at 935.
101 See N.J. OVERVIEW, supra note 91, at 8-9; see also infra note 108 and accompanying

100

text.

12M Consumption patterns are an aspect of the lifestyle that members of a status group share.
M. WEBER, supra note 4, at 937.
103 See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
'0

See N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 18, 186.
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Occupation

In the view of some social theorists, occupation is the chief determinant of social status; it has been asserted that "[w]hatever criterion of
social stratification one prefers, prestige or income, spending habits or
styles of life, education or independence, they all lead back to occupation."' 0 5 As described below, insurance companies draw upon the associations between occupation and the determinants and trappings of
social status in making underwriting decisions. 10 6
Occupation provides a clue to the income of an applicant. 0 People with steady incomes are desirable because they can pay premiums
and maintain their property. Moreover, affluent people are especially
favored customers because their consumption patterns generate multiple
insurance needs that, from a marketing standpoint, make them prospects for different kinds of coverages' 0 8
Occupation is also thought to reflect the value orientation of an
applicant for insurance.1 0 The companies start with a normative ideal
insured.11 0 He is achievement-oriented and interested in the acquisition
and preservation of wealth and property, whether or not he owns it. He
is sufficiently apprehensive about the future to need insurance, but he
believes that he is primarily responsible for fulfilling his needs and accountable if he fails to control his actions. He is also charitable enough
106
R. DAHRENDORF,

CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 70 (1959).
106G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 73.
107 Id. at 74. Another indicator of income used by insurers is prior policy cancellation for
nonpayment of premiums. Sheldon & Sarason, supra note 9, at 829.
108 G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supranote 23, at 74. See also supra text accompanying
notes 101-03.
The correlation between occupation and values is likely to be greater if occupational attainment and achievement depend upon compliance with the norms and life style of a particular
social status group rather than if the latter are the product of the former. Claus Offe offers a
"critical analysis" of the achievement principle that is supposed to reward superior individual
functional performance with occupational status and, through occupational status, social status. C.
OFFE, INDUSTRY AND INEQUALITY 42 (1977). Offe argues that the achievement principle has become "perverted and repressive" because work conditions are technically and organizationally determined in such a way that production is beyond the control of the individual worker. Id. at 9899. The ranking of occupational roles is no longer dependent upon functional content, but upon a
culturally determined normative hierarchy of values associated with occupational roles. Id. at 53.
The system of differential wages rests on a normative basis as well. Id. at 116. Consistent with a
restriction of the opportunity to demonstrate "individual goal conforming performance ability,"
improving one's status is linked to demonstrating "the needs and life styles which suit the normative system which claims validity in the work situation." Id. at 73-74 (emphasis in original). The
achievement principle has been "a disciplinary technique which rewards loyalty to the dominant
interests and forms of life. It perpetuates cultural divisions and creates and stabilizes the appearance of an objective or 'technical' legitimacy of organizational hierarchies." Id. at 138.
110 See J. LONG, ETHICS, MORALITY AND INSURANCE 26-40 (1971). The ideal insured possesses those attributes associated with what Long describes as the "ethical pillars" of a "sustained
and healthy execution of the insuring process." Id. at 26. Long, however, denies that the attributes
are related to the underwriter's short-term aims. Id. at 26 n.9.
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to tolerate the limited redistribution of wealth that is an unavoidable
aspect of loss spreading through insurance. Honesty and obedience to
the law are hallmarks of his character. He is committed to an orderly
existence conforming to tradition. He pursues change, if at all, in a
cautious and predictable manner."" 1
Automobile insurance underwriting guidelines associate certain occupations with shoddy values and risky behavior patterns as compared
with the ideal.11 2 According to underwriters, bartenders tend to have
drinking problems, 11 3 while entertainers, musicians, and race track employees occupy jobs linked with looseness dishonesty, and instability."
Vigorous physical occupations like mining, law enforcement, and military service are- presumed to attract persons with violent personalities,
aggressive driving habits, and a minimum of self-restraint.11 5 The clergyman's lack of concern for worldly affairs and materialistic goods
weighs against him. 6 Included on lists of undesirable applicants are
taxi drivers, who may be thought to be-'contemptuous of auto safety
even when driving their own cars, and automobile salesmen and
mechanics, who may be considered too claims-conscious and too likely
1 17
to submit extravagant or fraudulent claims.
Insurance companies even assume that occupation provides dues
to a person's life style and behavior patterns.1 8 Occupation sheds light
on where the insured automobile will be parked, who the insured's associates might be, whether the insured is subject to stress at work, and
how far and under what circumstances the automobile will be used. 9
For example, underwriters believe salesmen often must drive in bad
weather when others, driving for pleasure, might stay home;1 20 they
may also make sales calls in "rough" neighborhoods or heavily traveled
urban areas.
...Cf Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 91 (attributes of model insured for homeowners coverage as summarized in Continental Insurance Company's underwriting manual).
Ila The Travelers Insurance Group has ranked occupation in descending order of desirability. Editors, reporters and photographers are listed 30th; their own insurance agents, 62d; members of the legal profession, 66th; and churchworkers, 83d. Rights and Remedies, supranote 27, at
84.
115 See id. at 729 (quoting Hartford Personal Lines Underwriting Manual).
14 SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 23.
*" Id. See also Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 26-30 (testimony of service
personnel).
* R. HOLTOM, RESTRAINTS ON UNDERWRITING 34 (1979).
"See SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 24.
11
See Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 729 (excerpts from the Hartford Personal
Lines Underwriting Manual).
'I Rights and R,'-nedis, supra note 27, at 211 (testimony of Anton A. Lubimir); G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 74.
"o SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 23.
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Property insurance underwriting similarly considers occupation. 12 1
An insurer concerned with rejecting applicants who are irresponsible,
unstable, and immature can allegedly rely on occupation in assessing
risks.1 22 Insurers assume that "[s]ome occupations require considerable
travel, which increases the exposure to theft. Other occupations call for
,a life style which is not conducive to a stable home life. Still other
occupations are notorious for instability and job-jumping.1 123 Among
the occupations associated with higher homeowner policy losses are antique dealer, automobile dealer, advertising executive, hairdresser, fashion designer, loan shark, painter, and waitress.1 2 '
B.

Age, Sex, and Marital Status

Age, sex, and marital status are traditional ascriptive status criteria
that are significant to insurance companies primarily because
they determine an individual's role in a nuclear family, which is a status group bound by kinship and comprising a household. The family
gives its members a normative and economic orientation. Insurance
companies assume that risky behavior is negatively correlated with responsibility for or dependence on a stable familial unit. Moreover, family members who share a household generally share the economic advantages and disadvantages of the household head or breadwinners. 2
Age, sex, and marital status have combined significance in automobile insurance rating.1 27 After a limited use in 1939, age was reintroduced as a rating criterion (with ample statistical support) in 1950
when insurance companies began to charge drivers under 25 higher
premiums. 128 Beginning in 1953, marital status and parenthood were
1 25

122Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 82-84.
'2 See G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 258.
123

Id. at 260.

124Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 91 (excerpts from Continental Insurance Com-

pany's underwriting manual).
'25 Status may be achieved by virtue of one's accomplishments or ascribed by virtue of the
happenstance of one's birth. R. NISBET & R. PERRIN, supra note 98, at 145-47.
126 T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 160-61 (1951). See also M. WEBER, supra note 4, at

359.
127 The General Accounting Office states that "[w]hat is at issue here is a question of public
acceptability, not a question of fact." GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 113. At least one company
has moved away from the use of age, sex, and marital status as automobile insurance rating
criteria. Id. at 111. In 1977, Commercial Union Assurance announced its intent to replace these
traditional criteria with the insured's driving experience, driving record, claims history, and driver
training. Id. Also to be weighed are "vehicle use," taking into consideration territory, type of
driving, and annual mileage. Id. See also NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Prop. & Casualty Ins. ed.), May
14, 1982, at 85, col. 1.
I- H. ZOFFER, THE HISTORY OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE RATING 111-16
(1959).
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used to differentiate among the under-25 drivers.1 29 Single drivers were
charged more than married ones. Young people who drove only occasionally and were subject to parental supervision and young marrieds
who were burdened by parenthood were charged lower rates because
insurers assumed that they drove less and were more stable and responsible than their peers. Sex was added as a criterion in 1955.30 Young
males were charged more than females because females made less frequent use of the family car." 1 Moreover, it was assumed that the female who did drive was "frequently a business or professional woman
with a sense of responsibility or [was subject to] the restraining influence of family responsibility or parental supervision."" 2
At the present time the youthful driver categories generally include
the following subgroups: single females under twenty-five who are occasional operators of the insured vehicle; single female principal operators under twenty-five; married males under twenty-five; single male
occasional operators under twenty-five; and single male principal operators under twenty-nine." Whether a driver is deemed an occasional
or a principal operator depends upon the underwriting rules of the insurer, the judgment of the underwriter, and the veracity of the
1 34
applicant.
Some youthful drivers are the beneficiaries of discounts that reduce
their premiums. Full-time students in academic programs whose grades
place them in the top 20% of their classes may be eligible for good
student discounts; part-time and vocational students may be excluded.13 5 Under the resident student pricing formula, single females
and single males who reside at school a specified distance from home
and use the family car during school vacations and holidays are generally rated as if they were "married." ' In those jurisdictions where
newly licensed drivers are surcharged (the surcharge falling unavoidably on the young),137 youths eligible for the resident student discount
escape the added cost. 8' Finally, youthful operators who have taken
driver training may be eligible for a discount.1 9 In his report on autoId. at 143, 146-47.
at 158.
131 Id. at 158, 159. See also N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 91-92.
"

130 Id.

,'

H. ZOFFER, supra note 128, at 159.
SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 35-36. Married females of any age are usually classified as
adults. Id. at 30.
134 N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 95-96, 122, 124-26.
5 See, e.g., id. at 94; see also G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 168.
13 See, e.g., N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 95, 123.
,37 See, e-g., id. at 96-97; G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 168-69.
See, e.g., N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 95.
"

s See, e.g., N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 97-98; see also G. GLENDENNING & R.

HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 168.
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mobile insurance classifications, New Jersey Insurance Commissioner
Sheeran examined those rating discounts for youthful drivers from "a
socioeconomic perspective."' 4 He concluded that the pricing criteria
favor the family with the resources to sustain its young in a state of
economic dependency through a program of full-time academic education. 4" Not surprisingly, pricing advantages were granted to a higher
percentage of youth from wealthy suburban communities than were
1 42
granted to their urban counterparts.
Age, sex, and marital status are also relevant to the assessment of
the premiums of adult drivers. Senior citizens over sixty-five pay less
than adult females
who, in turn, pay less than others classified as
"nonyouthful." ' 43 Marital status, if not a direct rating criterion for
adults, is indirectly relevant. The premium covering an automobile
driven by either one or both partners of a married couple will be assessed on the basis of the characteristics of the higher-rated partner,
generally the male."
14 5
Reduced premiums for senior citizens are of fairly recent origin.
Insurers traditionally rejected older persons on the assumption that
they suffer from physical and mental infirmities that affect their driving. 148 When different assumptions became prevalent, favorable underwriting decisions ind rate discounts developed.14 Now it is thought
that "the elderly use their cars less than other drivers, lead a leisurely
retirement and have childless households, permitting greater discretion
as to when, how much and in what circumstances they drive.11 48
Underwriters use similar criteria in evaluating applicants for automobile insurance.14 9 Despite the higher premiums they are generally
charged, young niales are not preferred risks.150 The stability of the
young driver is thought to be related to the amount of control his parents have over him." 1 Thus, a teenager living in a traditional family is
considered a good risk, particularly if his parents' driving record is
good (the driving habits of the parents being presumed to affect those of
N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 102-12.
141 Id.at 105.
142 Id.
'43SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 30-34.
144 See N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 273-74; see also Lanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co., No.
C81-719, (N.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 1981) (unsuccessful civil rights challenge to insurer's refusal to
renew coverage of insured after she married a man with a poor driving record).
145 N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 230-32.
'48See, e.g., Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 728-29.
147 G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 71, 164-66.
48SN.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 232-33.
140

14*Id. at

112.

'6
See, e.g., Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 732-36.
161 Id. at 728.
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their children).15 2 If the young driver comes from a "broken home," he
may have emotional conflicts that insurers fear will affect his driving. 15 3
Young persons living alone or in nontraditional settings are considered
both less subject to external restraint and generally more rebellious; this
implies aggressive driving behavior.'"
Marital status is of some importance in the underwriting of adult
15 5
risks. Persons living in the traditional nuclear family are preferred.
Insurers believe that family life has a stablizing influence and suggests
a commitment to sensible values and mores. 56 Those "living together"
are thought more likely to be irresponsible; in addition, underwriters
fear that with such arrangements a wider circle of people might be
driving the car.15 7 Divorced people (especially those whose marriages
were recently terminated) are considered suspect drivers because divorce generates emotional turmoil that may lead to problems on the
road.158 Widowed people are chancy for much the same reasons, but
less so because widowhood, unlike divorce, is not associated with a lack
of maturity and irresponsibility. "9 Common-law marriage might be acceptable if of long duration, but otherwise is viewed as showing a refusal to assume responsibility.' 60
Marital status is of like relevance to property insurance underwriters.' 6 1 For example, married people, particularly those with children, are preferred because it is assumed that someone will be at home
15 G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 70-71.
'5
SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 21.
154 Id.

"" N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 92-94.
IN G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 72-73.
157The term "mingles" is used to describe unmarried individuals living together. R.
HOLTOM, supra note 116, at 27. The industry position is that such a relationship
is a temporary, transient type of living situation in most cases, with each party
feeling free to terminate the arrangement at will. Thus, it is the direct opposite of
the stability which underwriters desire. . . . The difficulty is that one who mingles
may change living partners with ease. If an automobile policyholder is a young
woman, her present mingling partner may be acceptable as an occasional driver,
but what if he leaves and another man takes his place?
Id. at 28.
I" Abramoff, supra note 9, at 686 n.14. See also Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at
804-05 (submission of Crum & Forster Insurance Co. supporting marital status underwriting
guidelines with loss statistics); N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 93-94 (quoting from Continental
Insurance Company's underwriting manual).
16 See, e.g., Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 12-25 (testimony recounting widow's
experience with Allstate Insurance Company).
16 G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra 23, at 73.
161 Like automobile insurers, property insurers look upon the divorced applicant as undesirable business: "'[D]ivorced persons may feel the effect of strained finances and consequent failure
to maintain property. Occasionally the new-found freedom from family responsibility produces a
change in life-style which may be productive of poor experience.'" CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra
note 42, at 8 (quoting a Citizens Insurance underwriting manual).
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during the daytime1" 2 and that couples will spend more evenings and
weekends at home than unmarried people.
C.

Territories

Territory, a common status-grouping criterion, is also employed
by insurance companies in classifying customers.1 3 In modem society,
people do not generally perform all of their activities-work, leisure,
education, trade, and domestic life-in a single geographic area.'6
Rather, they travel among a cluster of territorial enclaves that are generally devoted to one specific function or another. Land, like the people
situated thereon, is differentiated, functionally specialized, and hierarchically ranked.' 5 Groups are identified with and identify themselves
with stratified geographic areas. Where people live and work and how
involved they become with the groups to which they belong by reason
of such geographic location reflects their status. The industry is aware
of these associations: "Geographical divisions, however designed, are
often correlated with sociodemographic factors such as income level and
race because of natural aggregation or forced segregation according to
these factors."' 8
The base amount on which an individual's automobile premium is
calculated depends upon the territory in which the insured automobile
is garaged or stored overnight. 6 Insurance companies recognize that
drivers do freely traverse territorial lines, but the companies insist that
people predominantly drive close to home, which is where most accidents occur.' 8 Population and traffic density are said to be the chief
factors influencing the drawing of territorial lines, 9 along with differences in law enforcement, climate, street design, medical and repair
costs, wage rates, jury attitudes, claims-consciousness, and crime
rates. "' A single territory often consists of one or more political subdiG. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 259.
For a general discussion of the use of territory in automobile insurance rating, see GAO
REPORT, supra note 11, at 133-40.
16 Coleman, Community Disorganizationand Urban Problems, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 578-88 (R. Merton & R. Nisbet 4th ed. 1976).
16 T. Lowi, supra note 7, at 18.
162
1"

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATIONS IN PROPERTY AND

CASUALTY INSURANCE 91 (1976) (Final Report) [hereinafter cited as SRI FINAL REP.].

167 G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 111, 159; SRI SUPP., supra note 12,

at 44.

16 In re Public Hearings of the Ins. Comm'r Relating to Auto. Ins. Territorial Classifications-Effect on Rates, File No. RH, 207, slip op. at 33-34 (Cal. Ins. Comm'n Dec. 20, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Calif. Findings]; N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 296.
169 G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 158; SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at
42. 170 Calif. Findings, supra note 168, at 17; G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23,
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visions of a state. 17 1 In addition, ZIP codes have proven to be a useful
tool for territorial differentiation. 17 2 Although the United States Postal
Service makes no attempt to distinguish between status groups in the
assignment of ZIP codes, 17 3 what is strictly an administrative convenience to facilitate the delivery of mail is nonetheless a useful indicator
of social status to insurance companies, as well as to magazine publishers, political parties, aid product marketers.' 74
Because insurance companies give credence to the popular image
of the city as an area of blight, high crime, on-street parking, and narrow, congested thoroughfares, urban areas wind up with higher base
rates than suburban areas. 17 Also, city residents are supposedly of
lower educational and economic attainment, factors that are associated
with higher accident involvement.1 7 Suburban commuters play a role
in making urban territories riskier and irisurance premiums for
urbanites higher.177 Although the city accidents of suburbanites are
charged to the suburban territories where they live,17 8 when commuter
traffic contributes to an accident between two urbanites, the accident
will be charged solely to the urban territory. 9
at 159. But see N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 291-95 (finding no support in factors allegedly
dictating territorial lines).
271 SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 42. It is not unusual, however, for a single political subdivision to be divided into multiple territories. For example, Boston, Ma. is divided into nine territories. Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 8.
172 G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 159.
173 The first three digits of the five-digit ZIP code designate the entire delivery area of a
major post office, while the last two digits specify delivery areas serviced by smaller associate post
offices or branches. US. Postal Service Plan for the Nine-Digit ZIP Code: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as ZIP Code Hearings].
174 "ZIP codes are now matched with census data, political party registration and other information for all kinds of marketing purposes. For example, someone wishing to sell swimming
pools would solicit by mail only from high income ZIP Code areas.. . ." H.R. REP. NO. 1531,
96th Cong., 2d Sess, 23 (1980). The potential for abuse of a nine-digit ZIP code was cited during
congressional hearings as an objection to its adoption. See, eg., ZIP Code Hearings,supra note
173, at 22 (statement of Congressman Andrew Maguire).
175 N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 293, 294.
27 Id. at 304-05 (quoting Continental Insurance Company's underwriting manual).
177 The effect of suburban commuters on urban insurance rates is the subject of much controversy. See Calif. Findings, supra note 168, at 11-12; N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 356-74;
Stone, Excerpt from the Opinion, Findingsand Decision on 1978 Automobile Insurance Rates, in
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RISK CLASSIFICATION: EQUITY & ACCURACY 144, 163-65 (1978) (published by Mass. Div. of Ins.) [hereinafter referred to as Mass. Opinion and EQUITY & ACCURACY,

respectively].
175 Accidents are charged to the home territory of the automobile involved. Calif. Findings,
supra note 168, at 24-25. See also id. at 11-12, 25; Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 164; N.J.
REPORT, supra note 67, at 300-01. Commuters are also charged for the use of their automobiles in
driving to and from work. SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 34.
175 Calif. Findings, supra note 168, at 11-12. Commissioner Stone asserts that the resulting
overpricing of city insureds leads to subsidization of higher income suburbanites by lower income
urban dwellers. Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 164. See generally Etgar, Unfair Price Discrinination in P-L Insurance and the Reliance on Loss Ratios, 42 J. RISK & INS. 615 (1975).
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Territory is also significant in automobile insurance marketing
and underwriting."1 0 Because agents generally build a clientele in their
immediate neighborhood by establishing rapport with members of the
community, insurers do not place agents where business is not
wanted." As a result, access to insurance producers is restricted for
residents of city areas that are considered undesirable.
Additionally, auto insurance underwriters consider the physical
risk to which the insured automobile is exposed, the type of residence
in which the applicant resides, and its location.18 2 Cars parked in garages or driveways suffer fewer losses through theft, vandalism, and
hit-and-run collisions than do cars parked on the street. An underwriter will prefer a person who lives on a safe and quiet street to one
whose street is busy and dangerous, even if the streets are adjoining and
are located in the same territory. Use of the automobile in a territory
other than the one where it is garaged overnight is not considered important, even if the automobile is parked on the street all day. The
place of garaging is deemed to be more significant because it is
controllable. 8
In fact, insureds can manipulate to some extent the designation of
the territory in which the insured automobile is garaged. It is not uncommon for an insured who has a vacation home located in a lowerrated territory to list it as the place where his car is garaged instead of
listing his principal residence.'"
In property insurance, territory is a principal underwriting and
rating criterion. The likelihood of natural disaster, the incidence of
theft and vandalism, and the quality of police and fire protection vary
with the location of the property. 5 Suburban or rural isolation from
civic services and neighbors who might report emergencies is a negative
consideration, but location in the heart of a densely populated city is
also undesirable because of the increased possibility of man-made
calamities.
Insurers' reluctance to extend coverage to urban property owners
stems in part from their assumption that there is a dose relationship
between territory and the value of a building. Property insurance generally reimburses an insured for a partial loss to the extent of the cost
N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 286-87.
.1 Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 49; N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 286.
12 G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 81-82.
'. Id. at 81.
16 Shayer, Driver Classification in Automobile Insurance, in EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra
note 177, at 1, 15.
1" G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 236, 264-66.
16
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of repair or replacement, less depreciation.1 8 Such a measure of recovery may create an incentive to destroy property having a market value
that is less than its repair or replacement cost,18 1 a common characteristic of the housing stock in urban areas.18 8 Insurers avoid the risk of
intentional destruction by employing the practices associated with
"redlining." 8 9
This discussion is not an exhaustive review of marketing, rating,
and underwriting criteria. Insurers do employ classification criteria that
are less obviously associated with status groups than those reviewed
above. For example, automobile insurance underwriters consider driving ability as reflected in accident involvement, traffic violations, and
driving history."' Although these criteria do not identify and are not
identified with any particular status group recognized by the society at
large, a record of traffic violations, for instance, may attest not to an
individual's lack of capacity as a driver, but to his membership in a
group that is the target of discriminatory traffic enforcement.1 9
D.

Implications

The controversy generated by the insurance classification process
arises from the same sources that produce discontent with the overall
societal structure of hierarchically arranged groupings of individuals by
status and role. These sources are, first, limitations on the options
available to individuals who wish to assume more desirable statuses and
roles, and second, destruction of the bonds or ties that make the statuses
and roles individuals can and do assume meaningful.1 2
Insurance companies are blind to social conditions in a way that
creates and reinforces impediments to individual mobility and advancement. Insurers evince little concern for individuals who have adopted as
reference points for governing their lives the values, behavior patterns,
* R. KEETON, supra note 6, at § 3.9.
18 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 42, at 13.
18 See Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 85-86 (testimony of William S. Gibson); see
also CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 42, at 7.
18 See supra note 42.
' G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 62-69. See also infra note 282.
18 But see N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 406 (the "mere supposition" "of uneven law
enforcement" should not limit merit rating). Cf infra text accompanying notes 298-300 (discussing the threat to autonomy posed by merit rating).
M See generally R. DAHRENDORF, LIFE CHANCES: APPROACHES TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1979). Dahrendorf defines life chances as socially provided "opportunities for individual
growth, for the realization of talents, wishes and hopes." Id. at 30. Life chances are a function of
options ("possibilties of choice, or alternatives of action") and ligatures ("allegiances," "bonds," or
"linkages"). Id. In Dahrendorf's view, the absence of either options or ligatures can produce anonile or lead to social change. Id. at 87. Dahrendorf's book is devoted to a liberal attack on the
egalitarianism that has destroyed ligatures; his position is at odds with that pursued in this article.
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and economic expectations of status groups of which they are not members. Not only do insurers fail to recognize the widespread aspirations
of advancement up the status hierarchy, but they also ignore the normative and behavioral socialization that is produced in anticipation of
social mobility. Moreover, an individual's place (and even a group's
position) in the social order is not static in the way insurance companies perceive it;193 insurance companies are slow to recognize actual
change.
Reduced opportunities for social mobility and threats to gains in
status already won generate frustration and conflict. When expectations
for advancement exceed the means for achieving it, aspiring individuals
view the social order as unfair, illegitimate, and oppressive.19 4 They
compare their treatment to that received by groups occupying more favored positions in the status hierarchy and endeavor to undermine or
avoid the effects of the status groupings that frustrate their aspirations.
To the extent that the insurance classification system creates or simply
reinforces existing roadblocks to social mobility, then, it too produces
conflict and controversy.
The classification controversy may also be likened to a class struggle. The report of the former New Jersey Commissioner of Insurance,
which emphasizes the correlation between high socioeconomic status
and favorable marketing, underwriting, and pricing treatment, 95 implies that insurance classifications are antiquated and discriminatory in
their treatment of the lower classes. This too would account for the
controversy. Yet, an analysis that focuses exclusively on the battle for
status and its trappings obscures the dimensions of the controversy surrounding the stratification practices of insurance companies in particular and society in general. The struggle to escape the consequences of a
life restricted by status and role is not confined to people at the lowest
socioeconomic levels or to those grouped by ascriptive criteria they cannot alter. Hostility toward the existing social order can be found even
among those for whom the upper reaches of the hierarchy of status and
role are anything but closed.""
See, e.g., N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 208.
R. MERTON, supra note 97, at 321-22. Commissioner Stone provides an example of such
behavior. "As rates reach elevated levels, particularly for drivers with clean records, a massive
degree of resentment is generated. Some people who feel they are being cheated by the system are
inclined to respond in kind. The incidence of fraudulent claims rises most rapidly where rates are
highest, and a vicious cycle is born." Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 151. Commissioner Stone
has elsewhere described insurance rating as "a pricing structure.. . whose only incentives are for
fraud and resentment." Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 95-96 (testimony of James M.
Stone).
13
14

119See, e.g., N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 104-12, 304-09.
See A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 325-26 (1970).

1983]

INSURANCE

Insurance companies do not view any insured as a whole person.
Rather, every insured is compartmentalized. He is the sum of the many
roles he plays as a result of being a member of many status groups. To
an insurance company, the same individual may be an adult, a female,
a divorcee, a parent, a lover, an executive, a debtor, a homeowner, a
citizen, an urbanite, a commuter, a teetotaler, a lawbreaker, and a
klutz. She is not a plenary, monolithic person. The company does not
know her; it knows only the roles she plays.1'9
Although the multiplicity of roles may cause the individual to suffer normative conflict and uncertainty, role or status inconsistency does
not impede insurers. In automobile insurance pricing, for example,
each relevant role is assigned a numerical value; the individual insured
is literally the multiplicative product of his parts.' 9 8 Under the most
widely used assessment scheme, there are 234,360 possible cells or
groups into which drivers fall based on the 'results of the multiplication
process.' 9 Conflicts notwithstanding, the scheme provides a place for
everyone.2 o0
Of course, these insurance cells are artificial; they do not necessarily relate to real collectivities or groups with which the cell occupants
identify and in which they participate.20 ' But there is reason to doubt
that individuals have engrossing involvements with the many collectivities to which they actually belong by virtue of the roles they play. In
liberal society,
every individual belongs to a large number of significant
groups, but each of these groups affects only a limited part of
197 Cf R. UNGER II, supra note 3, at 184 (Under and within a bureaucracy, "[m]en know
and interact with one another as role occupants. . . .At no point do they acknowledge each other
as entire persons.")
19 For a fairly simple explanation of the multiplication involved in calculating an individual
premium and charts setting forth the typical rate relativities, see GAO REPORT supra note 11, at
104-11.
'" N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 21.
200 Under some plans there are more places than there are people to fill them: "[O]ne [automobile] insurer devised a plan which produced more than 500,000 rating slots for each of Illinois'
27 different territories, or a total of 13,500,000 rating slots in a State with an 11 million population base." Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 216 (testimony of J. Robert Hunter). See also
FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 4.
201 In any given jurisdiction there will be relatively few insureds in any given cell. Competitive individualism could result in cells of one. Furthermore, over-classification is itself a device for
"rating-out" unwanted risks by producing exorbitant rates "for certain unwanted classes." FULL
INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 52-53. The Federal Insurance Administration report also argues
that "[t]he proliferation of classifications militates against the concept of risk spreading which is
basic to all insurance," and that such overly refined classifications prevent collection of adequate
statistical data "to test the rate differentials between the various classes which were based initially
upon judgment." Id. at 54. See also Works, supra note 15, at 460-64 (stressing the inherent limits
of classifications, but noting that competitive forces create greater pressure for selectivity in
classification).
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his life. Thus, personality is carved up into a long list of
separate or even conflicting specialized activities. The reverse
side of this specialization is that the whole person comes to
be seen and treated as an abstract set of capabilities never
tied together in any one context of group life. 2
Despite this social fact, people want and need to belong to meaningful groups. According to the sociologist Robert Merton, "the individual's sense of being 'at one with himself' is often only the result of
being 'at one' with the standards of a group in which he is affectively
engaged. '20 3 One's sense of self depends upon the recognition of others,
which in turn depends on satisfying their expectations. Moreover, individuals exercise their capacities by meeting the needs and desires of
others. If there were no collective dependency, individual autonomy
would not exist.
Individual mobility and role specialization bring with them a
weakening of the kinds of bonds that communal solidarity and shared
experiences produce. 2 " The associations that fill the void are formed
out of a shifting coalescence of individual interest. People crave at the
same time the autonomy that is produced by a social order based on
specialized roles and the communalism that is generated by shared values, customs, and experiences.2 0 5 The two objectives are viewed as being incapable of coexisting: To assert one's individuality is to deny
one's community; to be absorbed in one's community is to lose one's
individuality. The tension between autonomy and communalism produces arguments for two sorts of change-one directed toward greater
individual freedom and mobility, and a second directed toward greater
recognition of the claims of aggrieved groups of people who see themselves as being meaningfully engaged with each other.20 8
III.

ARGUMENTS ATTACKING THE CLASSIFICATION PROCESS

The arguments advanced in the classification controversy reflect
the tension between individual mobility and group solidarity. Two
other tensions are also inherent in these arguments. First, the emphasis
on individuality is closely identified with arguments stressing the importance of the kind of competition that is associated with the free mar2" R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 143.
203 R. MERTON, supra note 97, at 384.

R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 168.
Id. at 128.
206 Id. at 236. But cd J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 193-94 (1954) ("That
social evolution has been either from collectivism to individualism or the reverse is sheer
104

205

superstition.").
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ket. In constrast, the focus on the conditions of groups relies on the
model of a market regulated with a regard for social welfare. In addition, the arguments also reveal a conflict as to the means by which
change is achieved. Some of the arguments assume that there exists a
consensus of values that can be called upon to resolve the controversy,
while others proceed on the premise that its resolution depends upon
the outcome of a political struggle.
Although the arguments may be clustered in several ways, the discussion that follows divides them into two categories. The first set
maintains the perspective of a competitive market regulated pursuant to
a widespread consensus that promotes individual mobility. The second
takes the perspective of a market controlled by social welfare considerations determined by a political process that is responsive to intragroup
unity and intergroup conflict.
A.

Arguments in the Individualist Mode

In the individualist mode of argument, the unavailability and
unaffordability of personal insurance produced by company grouping
practices are treated as if they stem from a competitive apparatus that
is basically sound but given to excess.207 The assumptions that underlie
this. perspective are briefly the following: Market conditions have
prompted insurers to make underwriting and rating decisions based on
criteria that are statistically unsound or downright outdated.210 Insurance companies have made erroneous decisions based on misconceptions
of the risks presented and their own anti-competitive attitudes.20' 9 New
criteria more closely associated with accident losses would further accountability, generate a deterrent effect, and promote economic efficiency. Restrictions on underwriting and rating practices would be perfectly compatible with this model of regulated competition. The market
would remain in the hands of the companies, which cannot oppose limited oversight intended to achieve the objectives of competition.
According to this perspective each insured should pay a premium
that is as commensurate as possible with the measurable risk he
poses. 2 0 Subsidization should be avoided.2 " The product should be al'0 See FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 8, 54-55. See also ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra
note 81, at 51-54.
128 ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 81, at 9.
20, The Report of the Advisory Committee on Competitive Rating to the NationalAssociation of Insurance Commissioners,2 NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS PROC. 415, 478-79 (1980). [hereinafter cited as NAIC PROC.].
110 See FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 7; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 14,
at 368.
211 GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 122. The position taken by these arguments is consistent
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located so as to avoid "moral hazards"21 and underinsurance. The
problems affecting personal property and automobile insurance can be
solved without a further blurring of the distinction between the public
and private markets; in fact, the distinction between the two markets
should be sharpened so that only poor risks wind up in the residual
mechanisms.2 13 Furthermore, public market insureds should bear the
costs of their own losses. 214 Any difficulties they face after wholesome
competition is restored are their own problem.
Individual autonomy would be maximized, of course, if an insured
were never burdened by the constraints of external judgments predicated on characteristics he shares with a group. The arguments based
on individualism, however, do not go that far. They do not deny the
propriety of grouping; they merely assert the right of individuals to
move into groups other than those in which insurance companies have
placed them.21 5 Individual mobility is crucial, and it is assumed that
grouping criteria can be accurate and rational, yet allow for mobility.
Moreover, because individualized judgments are wasteful and inefficient, grouping is an economic necessity.2 6 The failure to group would
lead to arbitrary decisionmaking. Yet, as the analysis that follows demonstrates, the irreconcilable tension between mobility and grouping destroys the coherence of the arguments.
Those seeking a change in insurance grouping practices through
individualist arguments claim that they are "clean risks" or good
risks-that is, better risks than those with whom insurance companies
have grouped them.21 7 Residual mechanism insureds who want to eswith the elevation of self-reliance and the abhorrence of sacrifice for the sake of others that are
associated with the ideal of individualism. On the abhorrence of self-sacrifice, see Kennedy, supra
note 3, at 1713-16.
21"A moral hazard is any characteristic or attitude of the insured that may increase the
frequency or severity of loss. H. DENENBERG, supra note 14, at 9. For a discussion of "moral
hazards," see Works, supra note 15, at 466.
"' See FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 74; Kimball, supra note 4, at 513; Works, supra
note 15, at 562-63 & n.294.
214 See FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 7; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note
14, at 368. The industry argues along similar lines that subsidy programs should not be the
responsibility of private industry. SRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 100.
2 5 See generally C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 167, 171-76 (1978).
216 See Thurow, A Theory of Groups and Economics Redistribution, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
25 (1979).
217 Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 904-05 (letter from J. R. Estefania). For a general discussion of "clean risks," see FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 38-45. But see Covey,
Meeting the Social Responsibility of the Auto InsuranceIndustry Through Full InsuranceAvailability, 2 NATL ASS'N INS. COMM'RS PROC. 754, 755 (1976). Covey defines clean risks as those
people who have had no accidents or violations in the past three years. Even so, "these drivers
have a consistently higher accident rate than any other group.... According to separate surveys
by the New York State Insurance Department, and by one of the nation's largest auto insurers,
dollar losses caused by the 'clean,' 'nonsurcharged' risk will exceed even those losses caused by the
driver with a record of accidents and repeated violations." Id. So insuring these untarnished risks
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cape to the private market disassociate themselves from the "truly bad"
risks who belong in the public market and seek identification with the
favored risks who have been insured by the private market. Accepting
the private market/public market distinction, those who want to break
into the private market simply argue that they have been placed on the
wrong side of the divide.2 1 8 Similarly, the private market insureds who
object to the criteria on which their premiums are assessed emphasize
the traits and behavior patterns they as individuals share with groups
receiving more favorable treatment, or argue that they do not possess a
negative characteristic associated with a majority of their group. Those
advancing such individualistic arguments for relief will be referred to
hereinafter as the "good-risk claimants."
The arguments in the individualist mode appeal to a supposedly
apolitical, entrenched consensus of liberal values. The asserted entitlement of any individual good-risk claimant advancing these arguments is
not based on the fact that he is one of a group of people sharing a
common predicament and willing to wield whatever political clout they
have in order to achieve a solution. Not surprisingly, the individualist
arguments are the ones that are most attractive to state and federal
regulatory authorities attempting to change company practices. The
most prominent of these arguments are those demanding classification
criteria that (1) reflect predictive accuracy, (2) constitute the causes of
accidents, and (3) reward merit.
1. Predictive Accuracy
Predictive accuracy concerns the extent to which classifications
identify differences in risk among individuals by placing in the same
class those posing risks that are essentially the same and in different
classes those posing risks that are essentially different. 21 9 Accuracy
would seem to be an attractive ground on which to resolve the conflict
over the classification criteria because accuracy is an attribute of facts.
The theory is that facts are subject to proof, because facts either exist or
they do not. 220 When they exist, they are true and correct without rewould unfairly raise rates for others less likely to suffer accident losses.
218 See

FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 39.

N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 77. The discussion that follows does not necessarily reflect the approaches statisticians or actuaries would take to the subject of accuracy. The concern
here is with the way both sides in the controversy use accuracy as a tool in a social, political, and
legal debate over the distribution of insurance protection and its costs. The analysis is based on T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); R. UNGER II, supra note 3,
at 31-36, 133-44; PARADIGMS AND REvOLUTIONS (G. Gutting ed. 1980).
210 Discussing life expectancies and mortality tables, Kimball argues:
219

[L]ife expectancy is a matter of fact, not of law. It is also a matter of averages, not
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gard to values, ends, goals, or ideals about which people may disagree.
Factual accuracy, then, could serve as a neutral value, end, goal, or
22 1
ideal that in and of itself should elicit broad support.
The good-risk claimants obstensibly accept this theory of objective
accuracy, and go on to attack the classification criteria as being either
inaccurate or, if accurate, in conflict with values of greater objective
importance than accuracy. Yet their arguments reveal an internal contradictory rejection of the basic premise. Accuracy as utilized in the
classification controversy does not conform to a standard of objectivity.
Analysis reveals that accuracy either cannot be defined in a neutral,
apolitical consensual fashion or must be balanced against, and sometimes give way to, competing non-neutral considerations through a blaThe predictive accuracy of the classification
tantly political process.
system and its political acceptability are thus inextricably bound.22 Legitimacy does not follow accuracy; quite the reverse is the case. The
criteria could be attacked on the ground that objective accuracy is no
basis on which to guage their propriety. Indeed, the good-risk claimants
seem to recognize that only politics can determine which criteria are
legitimate. Yet, they refuse to abandon accuracy in their quest for
reform.
Consider the claimants' attack on the accuracy of underwriting criteria for which there is little or no statistical support. Insurance companies, the claimants charge, do not collect statistics to substantiate their
underwriting practices, but rather rely on hunches, guesses, and stereotypes. 1 4 The good-risk claimants demand the collection of data to verify the predictive power of an underwriting criterion such as the terian individual characteristic.

.

. All any mortality table can do is to provide an

approximation of the true individual life expectancy which is more or less accurate

depending on factual questions relating to its data and the sophistication of its classifications and methodology, not on what Congress and/or the Supreme Court may
say. The blessing of the Supreme Court does not make a mortality table any more
accurate than it otherwise is .... If the mortality table is as accurate as the practical problems of the data and our knowledge permit, then use of the table treats the
parties as equally as they can be treated in an imperfect world.
Kimball, Reprise on Manhart, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 915, 917 (emphasis in
original).
"' See N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 540-41.
2"
As Works observes in a related context, "[a]ecuracy... has no customary defining ethos."
Works, supra note 15, at 558. Works says the terms "are sentiments, not standards, and they
share . . . '[t]he fundamentally insatiable character of political goals.'" Id. (quoting M.
EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 190 (1964)). See also Rights and Remedies, supra
note 27, at 127; N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 19. Cf Laycock & Sullivan Sex Discriminationas
"Actuarial Equality": A Rejoinder to Kimball, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 221, 225
("proper approximation" is not "most accurate," but depends on purpose for which approximation is used).
'See N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 4-5.
2"

ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 81, at 14.
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tory in which a homeowner's property is located. 22 5 Furthermore, the

claimants call for mandatory underwriting criteria reflecting reality as
painted by the data. 2 The alternative is to give free reign to the subjective judgment, intuition, and prejudice of the decisionmaker, be it the
bureaucrat who formulates the underwriting guidelines or the bureaucrat who applies them.
The proponents of the status quo (hereinafter referred to as "proponents") respond that scientific studies show that, overall, subjective

discretionary judgments of individually unique risks can be as accurate
in differentiating groups with different loss experiences as statistically
supported, rigidly applied rules.2 27 Moreover, they say, inaccuracy is
penalized and checked by the market. If one company misidentifies
good risks, another company will profit by realizing this and insuring
2 28

them.
A contradiction enters the arguments of the good-risk claimants
because they too envision some role for individualized decisionmaking,

"5 The GAO Report calls for the collection of data based on territories. GAO REPORT,
supra note 11, at 146. For opposition, see Ninety Day Report, supra note 48, at 529. The NAIC
Redlining Task Force Advisory Committee concedes that some data should be disclosed so that
consumers and industry can differentiate between insurable and uninsurable risks. It suggests
three components to disclosure: (1) reasons for underwriting decisions in particular cases with
respect to cancellations and nonrenewals; (2) unique features of new products that help consumers
in "mature communities"; and (3) explanatory material on how the industry operates. The committee argues, however, that ZIP code disclosure might produce ZIP code rating, which would
violate a fundamental principle of insurance-"spreading the risks over a large group." Id. at 530.
The committee further claims that ZIP code disclosure would confuse consumers. Surprisingly,
however, ZIP code disclosure has proven advantageous in curbing availability problems: after
mandating ZIP code reporting, underwriting significantly increased in those Illinois areas that
were formerly cancellation and nonrenewal areas. Wisconsin, Missouri, and Illinois now have
mandatory ZIP code reporting. See COIL PROC., supra note 50, at 41 (testimony of Philip R.
O'Connor).
"6 FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 73-75; ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 81, at 9596. See also SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 137.
I" The Continental Insurance Underwriting Manual states: "While we admittedly cannot
readily document our opinion on this and many other points, we are nevertheless, convinced without the slightest reservation, that when considered as a group rather than individuals, persons
engaged in some occupations have a greater frequency of loss under homeowner policies than do
persons engaged in some other occupations." Quoted in Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 83
(emphasis added). Some argue that "in a free market, those companies whose underwriters' [subjective] judgments are correct will prosper at the expense of other firms. As a result, market forces
push underwriting toward increasingly accurate risk assessments and there is therefore no absolute
need for statistical support." SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 19. See also SRI FINAL REP., supra
note 166, at 14; Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 166; N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 46. Cf.
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: PredictingBehavior with StatisticalInference and Indiidualized Judgment, 88 YALE LJ. 1408, 1423-25 (1979) (questioning studies that conclude statistical methods are more accurrate than individualized "clinical" methods).
2- FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 14. But says Commissioner Sheeran: "The argument
assumes unrealistically that the industry competes equally for all subclasses of insureds, even when
optimally priced. By their own admission, they do not." N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 71. He
adds: "Although a competitive market should be expected to ferret out systematic pricing errors
and penalize erring companies through loss of business and profit, pricing errors do not appear to
be self-correcting in the automobile insurance market." Id. at 19.
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though perhaps only after statistical data has been employed to debunk
the criteria currently used by underwriters. Consider the following objection to subjective underwriting:
[A]n underwriting rule may be unduly simplistic. It is easy
and convenient to write off entire areas or classes of people
who, on the average, have higher losses than other areas or
classes. It is more difficult, though more equitable, to find
the true reasons for variations in loss characteristics, and to
make individualized judgments based upon these factors. 229
While rules embodying statistically supported explanations for
riskiness will check subjectivity and arbitrariness, they cannot produce
decisions tailored to the situation of each and every individual applicant. The claimants who seek accuracy desire both the uniformity primarily associated with rules and the flexibility primarily associated
with discretionary decisionmaking (uniformity and flexibility being attributes each method could possess).2 30 Neither uniformity nor flexibility alone will guard against the ever-present twin threats to individual autonomy: inescapable, rigid grouping and competitive, isolating
mobility. "Uniform" rules will almost always be simultaneously labeled
"rigid," and "flexible" standards will almost always be simultaneously
called "biased." A combination of rules and discretion will not provide
a satisfactory alternative unless there is either a consensus as to the
proper mix of grouping and mobility or a consensus that grouping and
mobility do not conflict.2

31

In sum, the use to be made of statistical data

once it is collected does not depend on the supposedly neutral principle
of accuracy, but on the values producing the opposition between grouping and mobility.
The arguments attacking the accuracy of classification criteria that
are supported by statistics 282 are no less value-laden. The good-risk

claimants allege that criteria such as age and sex do not accurately predict the likelihood of accidents or loss involvement. 88 The claimants
contend that the groups identified by such criteria are neither so interEssENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 81, at 14.
20 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1710-13. Professor Underwood concludes that "clinical
methods protect most effectively against failure to consider unanticipated individual differences,
and statistical methods protect most effectively against the implicit use of illegal or otherwise unacceptable criteria for decision. The choice of a method must depend in part on which of these
dangers seems most threatening." Underwood, supra note 227, at 1432. The analysis here suggests
that each method entails a danger which the other might eliminate, and that it would accordingly
be preferable not to be forced to choose between them.
Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1712-13.
'n
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 72, at 1385-86; Comment, An Appraisalof Sex Discrimi22

nation in Setting Automobile Insurance Rates, 10 PAC. L.J. 201, 206 (1979).
1 See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 115-19.
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nally homogeneous as to justify similar treatment for all of those possessing the same grouping trait, nor so discretely heterogeneous as to
justify different treatment for groups possessing different traits.2 " '
The proponents of the present grouping practices admit that the
criteria they use are not completely accurate in that they do not completely account for the variance in losses, " 5 and further maintain that
accuracy and inaccuracy coexist. A classification criterion embodies
some measure of accuracy and some measure of inaccuracy; the choice
is not between one or the other, but among the points along a continuum between the two.23 6 In categorizing insureds, specificity and particularity must be sacrificed for generality and universality, with the
goal of attaining the maximum amount of ascertainable accuracy. The
proponents claim that their practices are as accurate as possible.23
In sum, a classification can be considered a generalization or theory about the way the world is. Classifications and theories vary in
accuracy as they vary in the extent to which they fit the particulars-the facts. Both the claimants and the proponents assume that
some classifications, like some theories of nature, are more accurate
than others and that the amount of accuracy embodied in the competing
classifications can be gauged in a neutral fashion by comparing the
classifications with the actual facts.2"
The good-risk claimants' attack on the internal homogeneity of the
automobile insurance rating group consisting of young males illustrates
their pursuit of greater accuracy through greater attention to particularlity.23 9 All young male principal drivers, for example, are charged a
premium equivalent to the average cost of insuring the class, 24 even
though some of them are below-average risks and some are above-average risks.241 Until recently, pricing them all at the average was consid134

See, e.g., N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 77-78.

315 N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 57; SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 49.
136 The choice is made from among "competing approximations," with the consequent debate

over how to select one of them. See Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Disckinination
in Employer-SponsoredInsurance Plans:A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV.
505, 512-13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brilmayer; see also Rights and Remedies, supra note 27,
at 82-85 (testimony of William S. Gibson), 211-13 (testimony of Anton A. Lubimir); N.J. RE.
PORT, supra note 67, at 77-81, 536; Kimball, supra note 220, at 916-17; Laycock & Sullivan,
supra note 222, at 224-25; Works, supra note 15, at 460, 471.
"7 See, e.g., Calif. Findings, supra note 168, at 22-23, 26; N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at
57-58 (citing company claims).
238 R. UNGER II, supra note 3, at 33.
2" See, e.g., Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 153-56; N.J. REPORT, supranote 67, at 6977. The heterogeneity of rating groups has also been attacked. See, e.g., id. at 67-69. Insofar as
sex is concerned, the argument is made that it is inaccurate to charge young men more than young
women because some young men pose a lesser risk than do some young women. Mass. Opinion,
supra note 177, at 153.
140 GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 115.
141 Id. at 122.
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ered accurate and perfectly acceptable, especially since everyone assumed that there was no way to distinguish the subgroup of better,
below-average risks from the rest.242 All in the class were charged the
same because each posed the same ascertainable risk.
Lately, however, a new perspective has gained adherents among
those advocating the relief desired by the good-risk claimants. According to this view, if all young men pay the same premium, the belowaverage risks are being overcharged and the above-average risks are
being undercharged or subsidized, relative to the amount associated
with the expected loss they actually pose.24 If the group of young men
is very heterogeneous in terms of individually expected loss, and those
at the low-risk end of the spectrum are appreciably less risky than
those at the high-risk end, it is possible that the low-risk young men
are bearing an undue amount of overcharge.2 44 Statistical experts working on the side of the good-risk claimants have developed a way to
determine what percentage of a class is being overcharged and by how
much. 45 The distribution and amount of the overcharges are said to be
important, even though the overcharged individuals cannot be
identified:
It is simple common sense that an individual wrongly
overcharged by a thousand dollars as the result of pooling
with a superficially similar group should be considered more
aggrieved than a hundred individuals each overcharged by
ten dollars in the interest of a broader spread of risk. The
focus of attention should turn away from class accuracy and
toward the equitable treatment of individuals. 46
24' See Calif. Findings, supra note 168, at 22 (summarizing companies' position); N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 71.
'" According to Kimball, who espouses the traditional view, the "subsidy" debate rests on
"[tihe misconception that premiums buy loss payments, as opposed to a contingent right to loss
payments if losses occur." Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination:Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 83, 106. This misconception leads to the notion that those who have no losses are
unfairly paying for those who do. Id. Nothing, argues Kimball, could be further removed from the
truth:
Insurance is an aleatory contract; premiums are paid for the transfer of risk. The
essence of insurance price-setting is calculation of the risk transferred. When that is
done accurately, there is no subsidy; each policy holder pays for the protection he
gets against risk. The person who suffers no loss ... [and] the one who does...
both have bought and received protection against comparable risks and thereby have
had equivalent benefits ....
Id. See COIL PROC., supranote 50, at 19 (speaker discusses the "inability of the public to distinguish" between the subsidization of risk and the subsidization of actual loss).
' Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 154-56.

1" See, e.g., Ferreira, Identifying EquitableInsurance Premiumsfor Risk Classes:An Alternative to the Classical Approach, in EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra note 177, at 74.
148 Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 158-59. But see G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-40 (1970) (the theory of the diminishing marginal utility of the dollar ignores changes

19831

INSURANCE

To reduce the burden on the low-risk young men, the experts suggest
that the premium charged everyone in the class be "tempered" or reduced and the cost spread among other classes of insureds. 4"
The claimants, of course, tout the superiority of their new perspective over that of the proponents. Says former Massachusetts Insurance
Commissioner Stone in discussing the opposition:
The most difficult lesson for those imbued with traditional post-war insurance thinking is that classification accuracy must be thought of in individual terms rather than
group terms. . . .Class accuracy by itself is not a legitimate
goal of an insurance pricing system. . . .To understand in-

surance pricing, one must turn away from comparisons between classes of drivers and focus instead on the size and
distribution of all of the individual errors within the
sytem ....248
There are, then, two ways of viewing insureds such as young male
drivers. One approach concentrates on the fact that, insofar as is individually ascertainable, they are the same. The second emphasizes the
fact that to a grossly measurable extent they are different. Each perspective is a generalization that leaves out something that the other contains. Each perspective is accurate given the general premise from
which it proceeds. The first is concerned with the fair and equitable
treatment of individuals who are to some degree homogeneous and the
second is concerned with the fair and equitable treatment of individuals
who are to some degree heterogeneous. The choice between the two
perspectives cannot be made by determining which fits the facts better,
because the facts on which the test of fitness depends are the facts as
ordered or emphasized by the perspective chosen. In couching the debate in terms of a choice between individual accuracy and class accuracy, the good-risk claimants are aware that "[i]t is the theory that
in status).
s Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 196-98.
3,8 Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 153-54. Professor Brilmayer and her collaborators
reach a similar conclusion:
One reason for the vigorous and so far unproductive disagreement about the answer
may be that most of the antagonists come from fundamentally different intellectual
traditions with respect to the individuals-versus-groups issue. The insurance tradition analyzes risks, premiums, and benefit schedules in terms of groups; most actuaries cannot think of individuals except as members of groups. . . .[H]owever, the
main civil rights tradition analyzes rights in terms of individuals. Its most fundamental principle has been that no individual shall be cOnsidered simply as part of a
racial, sexual, religious, or ethnic group, or treated differently because of his membership in such a group.
Brilmayer, supra note 236, at 508 (footnote omitted).
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determines what is to count as a fact and how facts are to be distinguished from one another.

' 249

If that is so, factual accuracy is not a
250

neutral basis for the allocation of insurance.
Still, however contradictory it may be, the good-risk claimants do
not abandon the view that accuracy can indeed be neutrally determined
and can be relevant to the resolution of the controversy. The ambivalent
position of the good-risk claimants with respect to the existence and
significance of objective accuracy is exemplified by the following statement made by former Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner Stone in
discussing the use of sex as an automobile insurance rating criterion:
"Finally, I am impressed with the State Rating Bureau's findings about
the small contribution that sex classification makes to predictive accuracy. My decision would be the same if gender factors in the rates were
of great predictive value. It becomes a simpler decision though, given
25
the actual facts.1

1

Furthermore, instead of rejecting accuracy, the claimants emphasize the limits of accuracy or hedge against the possibility that accuracy
will not be what they want it to be. Both they and the proponents will
abandon accuracy in favor of efficiency,252 equity,253 fairness, 2 4 risk
spreading, 255 social acceptability,2 56 or some other "public policy" as
the determining value or as a competing value to be weighed in the
balance with accuracy. There is, as claimants recognize, also no agreement about what policy should replace accuracy as the determining
value, and no balance can be struck without a hierarchy that assigns
weights to the competing values. 57
The claimants waver between viewing factual accuracy as objective
and intelligible on the one hand, and as subjective and manipulable on
the other. Accuracy cannot serve as a basis for the resolution of the
classification controversy because it falls to mask an underlying conflict
over values.
u" R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 32.
'50 Concludes former Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner Stone: "There is ... no magic
point at any percentage of accuracy, either in universal terms or with respect to so-called inherent
risk, that represents an objective, optimal goal for the precision of the ... classification mechanism." Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 158.
251 Id. at 180.
252 See Brilmayer, supra note 236, at 513 n.33.
2 See Badain, supra note 27, at 15. See id.

s
s'

See Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 158.
See COIL PROC., supra note 50, at 54 (presentation of Richard Roddis).
157 On the impossibility of balancing when values are viewed as being subjective, see R.
UNGER II, supra note 3, at 94-95. See also Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 162 (characterizing
the balancing tests as "human and not mechanical").
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2.

Causal Connection

Causation is a second basis of attack on, and a second basis of
defense of, the status quo.25 The demand for a causal link between a
characteristic and actual losses is a variation on the accuracy theme.2 59
One would expect a strong statistical association between a characteristic and losses if the former is the cause of the latter. 260 More than that,
causation is a traditionally accepted basis for the assignment of moral
responsibility. 6 " Causation requires acts; it appears to go beyond status
and its use is therefore perceived as more just.26" Like accuracy, however, causation cannot serve as a neutral basis on which to resolve the
classification controversy because of its contradictory implications.
Value choices cannot be avoided and individual autonomy will be compromised if causal criteria are employed.
The good-risk claimants argue that a driver's sex does not cause
automobile accidents. If young males have more accidents than young
females do, it is not because of their sex but because males drive more
miles 2 and are more apt to use their automobiles at night or while in
highly charged emotional states. 2" The claimants demand the use of
causal factors that are within the control of the insured. 2 5 They conSee, e.g., Underwood, supra note 227, at 1444-47.
"0 Thus one report notes: "The actuarial models should be improved to become more
'causal' and to be more thoroughly verified." SRI EXEC. SUMMARY, supra note 91, at 25.
,,0But c Kimball, supra note 4, at 496 ("Not all categories for which considerable statistical evidence can be developed are in fact sound, since the defining characteristics chosen may have
only a partial correspondence with the true causal factors.").
"' T. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 241-42 (1977).
"'
As Commissioner Stone has described the causality debate:
2"

It is contrary to the most fundamental concepts ofjustice in this country to punish
people for factors wholly beyond their control. Rating by income is punishing policyholders for being poor, a condition presumably beyond most people's control. Our
legal system is also characterized by strong notions of what constitutes proximate
cause. Rating by hair color or income violates any reasonable notion of proximate
cause.
Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 161.
'" Teenage males drive twice as many miles as do females; the accident rates for 17- to 29year-old males and females per 100,000 miles driven are "virtually identical." NEW JERSEY DEPT
OF INS., HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES:
FINAL DETERMINATION-MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
102 (1981).
"" Shayer, supra note 184, at 1, 10. See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance
Comm'r, 65 Pa. Commw. 249, 265, 442 A.2d 382, 386 (1982) ("the male gender classification
was being employed. . . as a proxy for (1) the class of those who tend to drive more while under
the influence of alcohol and (2) the class of those who drive more during rush hour periods of the
day").
" See Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 161. Consensus about what is or is not controllable is unlikely. One commentator, for example, who supports the use of criteria based on selfcontrolled factors includes in the category of uncontrollable "immutable traits" occupation, scholastic record, education, and marital status. Abramoff, supra note 9, at 694 n.47. The only factors
passing muster are driving record, type of use (including territorial classifications), driver education, and annual mileage estimates., Id.
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tend that unalterable, noncausal criteria do not create incentives for
safer behavior.2"' The use of sex as an underwriting and rating criterion gives no indication that males as a group could reduce both their
accident involvement and their insurance premiums by driving less or
finding other emotional outlets. Moreover, any savings generated by a
change of behavior by individual young males would be spread over the
entire group and not solely among those who produced tltem. The incentive for any individual male to alter his behavior is weak as long as
he has no way of extricating himself from the group and obtaining
26 7
more favorable treatment short of altering his sex.
The proponents agree that causality is important, but assert that it
is indeed reflected in the criterion of sex,"' which to them is simply a
shorthand way of invoking behavior that causes accidents. The proponents further suggest that criteria more closely related to the causes of
losses or accidents cannot be employed because those causes are difficult
to identify and the material and intangible costs of detecting the existence of the causal factors in the case of each individual applicant are
too great.26 9 For example, miles to be driven may be predictive of future accident involvement, but insurers have not yet hit upon an unmanipulable way of determining the number of miles an insured has
driven or will drive. Information concerning an applicant's emotional
stability and drinking habits may be attained only at the cost of an
invasion of his privacy.2
The good-risk claimants, while arguing for causal criteria, also
recognize that there are impediments to explaining events by reference
to discrete controllable causes. This recognition destroys the coherence
of their arguments. The former Insurance Commissioner of New
Jersey, for example, attempted to recast the causal-link argument in
order "to avoid the analytical uncertainties surrounding questions of
strict causation. 2 72 In lieu of a requirement that the classification criteria be related to the causes of accidents, he would gauge the reasonableness of criteria by the extent to which there is a "direct" relationship
between the criteria and "the operations-related factors" on which the
probability of having an accident hinges-"how well, how much and
$" Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 162.
267 See id. at 161-62.
2"
COIL PROC., supra note 50, at 55-56 (presentation of Richard Roddis).
"'
See, e.g., Shayer, supra note 184, at 16-21.
*7 See id. at 17. But see Hoffer & Miller, The Distributionof Automobile Liability Insurance: An Alternative, 46 J. RISK & INS. 441 (1979) (proposing collection of liability insurance
premiums via a per gallon surcharge on gasoline).
*7
See COIL PROC., supra note 50, at 53-54.
71 N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 61.
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where on average the insured car is driven":1 73
The directness test therefore assumes that classifications cannot delineate the causes of accidents and that the proper focus is less causation per se than the relative potential for loss
among insureds. The premise of the proposed test is merely
that some variables are more likely related to loss-causing
behavior than others. 74
The Commissioner elaborates on his test as follows: "The closest
possible nexus should be sought. The more distant or indirect the relationship between the criterion segregating insureds and the operationsrelated factors, the more numerous are the potential intervening circumstances affecting individual accident likelihoods." 27 He gives an
example of how his approach works:
Most would agree that the quality of drivers' eyesight
. . .would be a reasonable basis for classification if it produced correlations to differences in accident experience. Poor
eyesight does not necessarily cause accidents. A driver with
impaired vision may curtail driving, drive more carefully or
otherwise adjust driving behavior to compensate. Nonetheless, a driver's physical impairment of this sort is directly
related to whether operation of the insured vehicle is likely
to be hazardous. Whatever the ultimate merits of using a
quality-of-eyesight variable, it is preferable under a "reasonable relation" test, all else being equal, to some variable
which seeks to measure the same driver trait but indirectly,
say through an age criterion.2 76
The Commissioner's test, however, eliminates neither the problems
attacked by, nor those in turn raised by, the causation arguments.
There is simply no neutral basis for choice among competing explanations of accidents. Casual links, no less than the Commissioner's "reasonable relationships," are predicated on something less than objective
and absolute certainty. B is deemed the cause of A, even though potential causes C, D, and E are also involved, because it is concluded that B
is more likely associated with A than C, D, and E. Causation always
involves a choice among several variables.
Any student of the law of causation knows that the direct/indirect
273

Id. at 60.

"4 Id. at 62 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 61.
176 Id. at 62.
275
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dichotomy as a basis for choice is inexact, if not entirely specious; the
terms are mere labels for conclusions that are not the product of a precise factual rule. Whether a direct relationship exists between a cause
and an event depends upon how many concurrent or intervening occurrences the finder of causal fact chooses to identify."" He is the director
who sets the stage; he arranges it so that the event directly follows the
cause. Poor eyesight is a direct link because the Commissioner chooses
to ignore the role of intervening causes like a failure to drive more
carefully or to drive only in daylight. The Commissioner has concluded
that it is appropriate that visually handicapped persons pay more and
has attached to their poor eyesight the tag "a direct relationship" in
order to justify the conclusion.
If causation really involves a judgmental choice among probable or
possible causes, as this analysis of the Commissioner's approach suggests, then causation, like accuracy, ceases to be an objective basis for
insurance allocation decisions. Every insured assessed according to a
"causal" criterion can complain, like the individual whose eyesight is
beyond his control,' 7 8 that his status or situation is being held against
him and his individuality is being ignored.
The ambivalent causation arguments of the good-risk claimants reflect the tension between the theories of voluntarism and determinism.279 In a theory of voluntarism or contingent, individually controlled
causality, accidents and losses are events that have causes that are produced by individuals and can be prevented by individuals. If events are
contingent-because their occurrence is within the control of individuals-individuals can be encouraged to avoid conduct that causes accidents and penalized when they fail to do so.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that any event may
have many causes. To isolate one cause requires that others be ignored.
Isolation is unavoidable, however, because treating every event as a
cause of every other"' is tantamount to having no explanation at all.
Yet, isolation requires a scheme for sorting among the potential and
- W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THiE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th ed. 1971); 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.6(4) (1956). Both treatises, however, acknowledge the usefulness
of the concept of directness despite its limitations.
*7 Persons with impaired vision that can be corrected with.sophisticated lenses have initiated
litigation asserting that the refusal to grant them drivers' licenses violates statutory and constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Liberati, 131 PrIT. LEGAL J. 55 (C.P. Allegheny County May 24, 1982); see also Rights and
Remedies, supra note 27, at 762-81 (statements objecting to discrimination against the blind and
the deaf).
"' The discussion that follows is based on A. GOULDNER, supra note 196, at 185-95; T.
HASKELL, supra note 261, at 240-50; R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 8-23.
"0 T. HASKELL, supra note 261, at 245; R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 10.
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actual causes. Neutrality and objectivity can be obtained only if there
are neutral, objective criteria on which the sorting may be based. The
directness test of the New Jersey Commissioner represents an unsuccessful effort to supply an objective basis on which to select among
causes of accidents.
Once a cause or a set of causes has been selected, accounts of accidents will be distorted. Whenever the event on which we have focused
as a cause is associated with a loss or an accident, the event will be
deemed the cause of the loss or accident; other events contributing to
the accident will be ignored. For example, if recklessness is a "cause"
of accidents for the purpose of automobile premium pricing, then recklessness is the cause of every accident befalling a reckless young man.
The account is distorted if another factor, such as the construction of
the highway, also played a role in producing the accident.
The process of causal explanation suggests that there is a necessary connection between the "causal" event and the accident. The
causes, in turn, have causes. They too are events and, as such, they too
are necessitated. 281 Taken this far, contingency gives way to determinism. Determinism may not be altogether unattractive, because it connotes neutrality, objectivity, and a world ordered by rules. But, given
determinism, causes are no longer within the control of individuals.
Rather, the assessment of causal relationships now depends upon the
individual's status or situation.
Deterministic necessity undermines the significance of individual
control and free will and, with it, the reason for demanding criteria
that are related to the causes of accidents. Yet the demand for such
criteria persists because, as a matter of ideology, accidents are considered to some extent within the control of the individual. A theory meshing voluntarism and determinism might solve the dilemma by suggesting that some things are controllable and some things are not, and
by supplying a test for determining which is which, but the effort
would be doomed. Causal attribution is merely a subterfuge and cannot
be a substitute for value judgment. 'The threat to individual autonomy
from value judgments externally imposed cannot be avoided by invoking notions of objective causation.
3.

Merit Rating

Taking a more positive tack, the good-risk claimants advance underwriting and rating based on merit as a substitute for the present
18

See R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 13.
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classification schemes. For example, whereas under the automobile insurance rating plans currently in use merit rating plays but a small
part,2" 2 the claimants propose that premiums depend totally or largely
upon the number of traffic accidents and violations attributable to the
insured drivers.2"8
Those who are clean risks2 " make particularly strong arguments
that the practices of insurance companies that purportedly take merit
into account do not go far enough. For example, insurance companies
generally surcharge drivers with accidents and traffic violations an
amount equivalent to a percentage of their regular premium. Some bad
drivers start out with low premiums because of the territory in which
they garage their automobiles or because of their demographic characteristics. As a result, they often wind up with total premiums (including
surcharges) that are less than the amount paid by clean risks who live
in higher-rated territories and possess higher-rated demographic characteristics. The following argument is typical of those made in attacking this disparity:
It just isn't fair to force a good driver, without tickets or
accidents, to pay more, based on where the person lives, than
a driver in another area who has a bad record with tickets,
accidents and even a drunk-driving conviction.
Auto insurance premiums should be based on the single
factor of a person's driving record. A bad driver should pay
more than a good driver. It's that simple.2"'
m For a general discussion of the prevailing limited use of merit rating, see G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 64-69; SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at 37-39. Many auto
insurers use some variant of merit rating as a secondary classification factor. Most companies
surcharge for accidents that result in bodily injury or property liability claims exceeding a specific
dollar amount (such as $100). Physical damage claims may also be considered. Merit rating plans
do not consider accidents that are obviously not the fault of the applicant, such as a collision
occurring when an auto is hit while parked or stopped, but do surcharge for other accidents, even
if fault is not dear. Merit rating plans also generally surcharge for certain serious traffic violations
like drunk driving, negligent homicide, and leaving the scene of an accident. Beyond this common
ground, plans vary; many insurers do not surcharge for any other kinds of violations, but others
use different charges depending on the severity of the violation. Examples of severe violations
include, in addition to those listed above, driving without a license, stealing a car, and falsifying
statements on a license or registration application. Serious but less severe violations include reckless driving or racing, refusing to take a sobriety test, and accumulating points leading to license
penalties. The least serious charged violations include driving with inadequate brakes and failing
to report an accident. Id.
" See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 119-20. An exception to the industry position is
Commercial Union Assurance Companies which, in a separate study, found that "'[bloth accident
record and conviction record are useful in predicting future potential for losses. . . . [Ilt appears
that it is valid and practical to use driving record as a primary rating factor.'" Quoted in id.
See supra note 217.
Rights and Remedies, supra note 27, at 51 (prepared statement of Kenneth Hahn, Supervisor, County of Los Angeles).
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The criterion of merit, as employed in the arguments of the goodrisk claimants, has the appearance of a neutral basis on which to distribute insurance.2"" It has much in common with criteria that are
identified with accuracy and causality. Merit is commonly invoked to
justify distributional results in other spheres of economic and social life.
In a scheme governed by merit, an individual earns and deserves his
place; his position is not the product of assignment by a dominating
force, nor the consequence of factors over which he has no control.28 7
Merit rating might be expected to provide incentives for reducing accidents and deterring the' kind of behavior that causes losses. 88 Even the
proponents of the status quo share the opinion that merit is relevant as
a classification, criterion although they disagree about the extent to
which it should operate.
Though the good-risk claimants invoke the ideal, they also seem to
realize that a scheme of distribution based on merit would be fatally
problematic in terms of individual autonomy and political neutrality.
They struggle unsuccessfully to reconcile the contradictions that make
merit both possible and impossible of achievement. Because a scheme of
distribution based on merit has many of the attributes of a scheme of
distribution based on status, merit is politically controversial. Ultimately, merit is only what a political decision determines it to be.
The acknowledgement of the significance of chance in accident involvement undercuts the claims for merit. Arguing that automobile accidents occur at random, 8 9 some proponents contend that people who
suffer losses are often simply unlucky 290 and not necessarily poor risks
for the future.29

1

To assess insurance premiums on the basis of mere

accident involvement does not eliminate the role of happenstance, luck,
and chance-factors beyond the control of the individual. The claimants respond that this defect is cured if merit underwriting and rating
surcharges are limited to accidents, violations, or losses attributable to
the fault of the insured.2 92 Yet the claimants ignore the possibility that
faulty driving may be attributable to a want of natural talent that is not
28 See R. UNGER II, supra note 3, at 167-68.
W8 Ferreira, Merit Rating and Automobile Insurance, in EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra note
177, at 57. Merit rating is perceived as individualized rating. See SRI SUPP., supra note 12, at
142.
Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 161; N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 398.
US N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 54. But see SRI FINAL REP., supra note 166, at 60.
("Most consumers and companies feel that 'accidents don't just happen-bad drivers cause
them.' ").
2
G. GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, supra note 23, at 65.
"' The typical merit rating scheme considers an individual's driving record for the previous
three years. Evidence suggests, however, that 80% of all accidents are caused by drivers who have
had no accidents in the preceding five-year period. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 121.
" See N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 398.
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distributed according to merit or subject to the control of the driver.
Even some factors within the driver's control, such as lack of attention
and foolhardiness, may be affected by natural abilities and outside influences like parental training.2 93
In any event, the good-risk claimants are reluctant to carry merit
to the extreme. The ambivalence is reflected in the following passage:
Although the equity and deterrent objectives of merit
rating are straightforward in concept, their results often fail
to match the public's expectations. If consistently bad drivers
caused most of the accidents and were readily identifiable,
merit rating might work very well. But, those who have accidents over a period of a few years are not always bad drivers
in any meaningful sense. A generally good driver whose rare
instance of misjudgment causes an accident should not necessarily pay significantly higher premiums during subsequent
years. Yet, if such unlucky drivers are not severely
surcharged, a merit rating plan is not likely to save good
drivers much money. It is difficult to design a merit rating
plan that is both equitable and financially severe enough to
serve as a deterrent.'"
In the prevailing discourse, there is an affinity between merit, on
the one hand, and chance or luck on the other. Whether merit is invoked to legitimate the status quo or to challenge it, chance operates to
limit what can be achieved through adherence to the objective principle
of merit. If merit does not adequately explain the status quo, chance
does. According to Robert Merton, the financially successful often attribute their situations to luck: "[T]he doctrine of luck as expounded by
the successful serves the dual function of explaining the frequent discrepancy between merit and reward while keeping immune from criticism a social structure which allows this discrepancy to become frequent.' ' 29 5 For the unsuccessful, the idea of luck preserves self-esteem
and legitimates the status quo by suggesting that the effort to seek a
greater correlation between merit and reward would be futile. 9 6
Merton identifies a third group who reject luck and adopt "an individuated and cynical attitude toward the social structure, best exemplified
in the cultural cliche that 'it's not what you know, but who you know,
"S3See A. GOULDNER, supra note 196, at 322-23.
2"

Ferreira, supra note 287, at 56-57.

"5 R. MERTON, supra note 97, at 202.
" Id. at 203.
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that counts.' ,"27
The good-risk claimants who are unsuccessful under the current
system but who would be successful if their arguments prevailed are
understandably ambivalent about merit and luck. Luck, chance, and
other factors that limit an individual's opportunity to control accidents
and losses frustrate the claimants' hopes of complete relief through
merit and cause them to temper their claims. The good risks exhibit a
sense of solidarity with the victims of bad luck. Perhaps because clean
risks will have accidents in the future, they identify with some of those
who have had them in the past, and express concern that merit rating
will impose a prohibitively high premium on the latter group. In sum,
then, the good-risk claimants invoke merit as the basis for altering the
status quo, but at the same time they recognize that individual autonomy will not be protected because of the role of luck.
The claimants' ambivalence about merit extends beyond the concern identified with chance to an uneasiness about the association between merit and desert. Although it is said that "[m]erit rating is not
justified as a mere punishment-reward system, nor, incidentally, as a
mechanism for recouping the costs of past claims,"2 98 clean risks appear
to be rewarded with a break in premiums while others are penalized.
Merit rating surcharges can easily be equated with fines and penalties
assessed for past behavior and not simply with sums warranted by an
increased prospective risk. The stiffer the surcharge, the more it seems
that the clean risks are unjustifiably benefitting themselves at the poor
driver's expense.
Fundmentally, the acceptability of merit rating hinges on whether
merit rating deters accidents or punishes drivers who happen to be
caught engaged in conduct of which some segment of society disapproves. If it does promote highway safety, the objective benefits of merit
rating may justify its use. If it is a sanction for antisocial behavior,
however, merit rating is a threat to individual autonomy, for it deprives
the individual of the freedom to choose the values that will govern his
life. Unless society as a whole shares an operating consensus, the individual is at the mercy of the values prevailing among the insurance
company executives and employees, regulators, legislators, judges, and
law enforcement officials who perform the tasks necessary to the implementation and operation of a merit rating scheme.1 99
Id.
N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 398 (footnote omitted); see also COIL PROC., supra note
50, at 12 (presentation of Emmett Vaughan).
" Despite her commitment to autonomy, Professor Underwood sees nothing grossly inconsistent in suggesting that "[a] good reason to use a particular behavior as a predictor of success
appears when society seeks to encourage or reward that behavior for reasons apart from its predicUS
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Merit comes down to this: It is no more neutral than accuracy or
causation. Meritorious conduct depends on what is valued. In the absence of consensus, merit can be a source of oppression and a device for
maintaining the status quo and penalizing deviants. 00 The good-risk
claimants can only appeal to shared values that distinguish an acceptable incentive for accident reduction from an illegitimate disincentive,
failure to comply with which will result in unjustified punishment. Because consensus is wanting, the claimants fear that autonomy is
threatened, and their ambivalance and inconsistency destroy the coherence of their claims for merit classifications. What constitutes meritorious behavior and the extent to which the distribution of insurance will
depend upon merit are political questions requiring political
decisionmaking.
None of the alternate classification schemes can achieve the claimants' stated goal of abolishing grouping that is inconsistent with the
principle of autonomy. Furthermore, accuracy, causation, and even
merit are all subject to value judgments that cannot be avoided by resort to a consensus agreed upon by all interested parties.
The individualist arguments end there. Decisionmaking by private
parties based on supposedly neutral principles is an impossibility. Proceeding as if it were possible can only result in the maintenance of the
status quo. Conflicting values and political decisionmaking cannot be
avoided.
B. Arguments in the Collectivist Mode
There is a second perspective and mode of argument employed by
those attacking insurance classifications. This perspective assumes the
existence of an economy regulated to promote social welfare, and the
arguments further a collectivism that demands group relief.
Those espousing the social welfare model reject the ideal of market
competition because, they assert, the profit-maximizing classification
practices of insurance companies do not deter accidents or reduce their
tive power." Underwood, supra note 227, at 1438-39. She continues:
When a favorable prediction-is based on socially valued, meritorious behavior,
then there can be little objection to the fact that the prediction scheme may induce
applicants to perform the acts that improve their scores. That inducement should be
seen not as an unjustified infringement of autonomy, but rather as an independent
good, on the theory that. . .[the rewarded conduct] has some social value apart
from its power to predict success.

Id. at 1441. She thus assumes that autonomy is not infringed by the designation of activities that
are socially valuable.
"0 See C. OFFE, supra note 109, at 98.
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costs.3 0 1 Moreover, competition has produced offensive discrimination
and an inequitable distribution of the insurance product and premiums.
Because insurance companies will not act in the best interest of insureds, distribution decisions cannot be left to them.30 Social welfare,
not private profit, must determine who is insured and how much he
pays. Capitalism is not entirely abandoned under this model, however,
30 3
for there is room in tie scheme for profit-making.
If subsidization is required in order to achieve availability and affordability, it is appropriate that insurance companies collect and redistribute the subsidy as if they were private tax collectors.'" The collectivist arguments acknowledge the demise of the distinction between
public and private entities and functions,3 0 5 and consider decisions concerning the distribution of the insurance product and premiums to be
political ones.3 06
07
The social welfare model is attuned to the demands of groups
and assesses the propriety of the distribution of goods, services, power,
301
30'

See G. CALABRESI, supra note 246, at 302-04.

Summary of Dissenting Comments by Consumer Members, 2 NAIC PROC., supra note

209, at 488-89 (1980).
"3 Squires, DeWolfe, & DeWolfe, Urban Decline or Disinvestment: Uneven Development,
Redlining and the Role of the InsuranceIndustry, 27 SOc. PROBS. 79, 90 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Squires].
304 See COIL PROC., supra note 50, at 6-9. One commentator has observed, however:.
Opponents of a cost-based pricing system argue that insurance premiums should
favor the poor at the expense of the rich. . . that is, that insurance should in effect
redistribute income. Such a pricing system is appropriate in a social insurance system, the purpose of which is commonly to provide on a compulsory basis a floor of
protection for all insured [sic], but. . . under a private insurance system, "there is
no reason why other insureds should be charged excessive rates in order to subsidize
their less fortunate brethren. If a premium reflecting the hazard of loss and expense
cannot meet legitimate costs, there is no more reason for using insurance as [a]
means of redistribution of wealth than for varying the price of gasoline according to
the ability of the car owner to pay."

Gerber, The Economic and Actuarial Aspects of Selection and Classification, 10 FORUM 1205,
1224 (1975) (footnote omitted) (quoting R. Blanchard,- Government Regulation of Business, J.
AM. INS., May 1945, at 16).
"0 See generally Symposium on the Public/Pivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982).
2" See generally Austin, The Problem of the Legitimacy of the Welfare State, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1510 (1982).
307Insurers recognize the fact that their actions are affected by interest groups and are adjusting their behavior accordingly. See Golanka, The Many Faces of Consumerism, J. INS., Jan.Feb., 1981 at 26, 30, for four observations for the 1980s: (1) insurance will be a hotter public
consumer issue; (2) the businesses that do the best job of dealing with consumer interests will
succeed; (3) single-issue groups at the grassroots level will have more importance; and (4) a communication challenge will demand a working partnership between industry and consumers. Some
insurers are making efforts to establish joint committees of insurers and consumers to deal with

insurance problems. See also Insurers, ConsumersMust Talk to End 'ConfrontationPolitics' III
President Warns, INS. ADVoc., Nov. 8, 1980, at 16. Insurers feel compelled to counter the controversy promoted by the media. Consequently, they have organized several consumer information
programs-Connecticut Open Line, Western Insurance Information Service and hotlines in the
offices of the Insurance Association of Connecticut and the Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania.
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and authority not at the individual level but at the group level. Collectivist arguments therefore recognize that improper classification and
discrimination by insurance companies demand group relief.3"' Those
advancing collectivist arguments will be referred to as the "group-relief
claimants."
The arguments in support of collective remedies are not particularly well-developed in regulatory decisions or iaw review articles. The
attack on insurance classification practices that appears in the legal and
insurance literature is largely couched in the individualist terms discussed in the preceding section. 0 9 Although the insurance markets are
regulated to promote social welfare, the departures from the competitive model are well-camouflaged. 10 American society is deeply wedded
to the ideals of individual responsibility, free competition, and equality
of opportunity. Actual mobility and role specialization dampen the development of collectivist unity; individuals concentrate on their own advancement.""' Even group activism is perceived to be motivated by a
coalescence of individual interests and not by group solidarity. 12 Collectivist arguments and activity are always vulnerable to attack on the
grounds that they ignore individuality, personal accountability, and
liberty.
The collectivist arguments explored in this section are most likely
to be found in the works of lawyer-activists, civil rights advocates, and
community organizers who seek change through a variety of political
measures. The arguments are weakened because they reflect the inadequacy of their proponents' underlying political theory and practice-a
theory and practice that focuses on a struggle between interest groups
and denies the possibility that conflicts may be resolved in a way that
produces a real consensus as to the common good.3 13 In failing to em3"' For example, the Metropolitan Area Housing Authority (MAHA) of Chicago led a campaign against Allstate Insurance Company that produced a 96% drop in policy terminations for 12
formerly redlined neighborhoods. Results were evidenced in little over a year. See R. SCHACHTER,
supra note 31, at 180. Insurance companies are fighting back in their own way. Companies sometimes pit insureds against each other to avoid regulatory reform. Id. at 140. In 1978, State Farm
sent scare letters to suburban Detroit policyholders to prejudice them against their neighbors in
the city. "'Because these high risk policyholders wouldn't pay nearly enough to match their
losses.' said the letter, 'someone should have to make up the difference for the loss, and that
someone is YOU and other good risk homeowners in Michigan."' Quoted in id.
3" See generally supra text accompanying notes 207-99.
810 See COIL PROC., supra note 50, at 32 (suggesting that one reason subsidies are included
as a component of insurance rates is that "it is a lot easier if the people don't know what the
subsidy is").
311 See D. BASKIN, AMERICAN PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 139 (1971); R. DAHRENDORF, supra
note 105, at 60.
31a See R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 69.
312 See D. BASKIN, supra note 311, at 72-74, 96; R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM

159-60 (1968).
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body a theory or practice that adequately accounts for social order and
change, the arguments are powerless to produce the desired relief. 14
Three collectivist arguments will be used to explore the deficiency. The
arguments present claims of three kinds: (1) of a right or entitlement to
insurance; (2) of social causality and shared responsibility; and (3) of
externalized costs of social benefits.
It must be emphasized that the critique that follows rejects the
possibility that the politics of interest-group pluralism is the best that
may be expected and therefore desired. It is premised upon the belief
that society can achieve a participatory democracy capable of rendering
and pursuing decisions that are more than the product of the compound
interests of stratified groups differing most especially in wealth and
power.3 1'5
1. Claims of Right
Adopting a collectivist perspective, the claimants assert that everyone in a given group has a right or entitlement to insurance. The claim,
which appeals to a principle of distributive justice or equality, is
pressed against the companies as well as the state, 1 6 in recognition of
the demise of the distinction between public and private power. The
rhetoric associated with the political sphere is invoked as a basis for
altering the allocation of goods and services, which allocation was formerly within the exclusive domain of the private market.31 While the
rhetoric may be transferable, its power and effect are not, primarily
because the allocation of economic rights seems to involve questions of
scarcity and sacrifice.
The group-relief claimants assert that personal insurance is included among the "civil rights."3 ' It is a basic necessity, not "just ansupra note 3, at 23-37, 262-65.
See Frug, supra note 3, at 1068-73. For extended discussions of the theory of participatory democracy, see C. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, 93115 (1977); C. PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 142-62 (1979) (discussing
Rousseau's democratic contract theory); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1970).
316 For an elaboration of a theory of economic entitlements, see Michelman, Welfare Rights
in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659 [hereinafter cited as Michelman, Wel314 See R. UNGER I,
311

fare Rights]; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
311 In the context of liberal politics, "rights" generally refers to "powers of the individual to
act within a sphere of absolute discretion rather than. . . [to] entitlements to definite substantive
goods." R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 85.
316 Cincotta, Insurance Redlining, Some Directions for Change, in INSURANCE REDLINING
AND REINVESTMENT: DIRECTIONS FOR CHANGE 7, 9 (1979) (report of conference sponsored by
National Training and Information Center and Illinois Advisory Committee to U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights) [hereinafter cited as DIRECTIONS].
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other commodity for which consumers choose to cast their dollar
'votes.' "19 A former Michigan Commissioner of Insurance, Thomas
C. Jones, has said that "for both society and the individual, automobile
and homeowner insurance is essential. Society's stability and growth
depend upon it and the financial equilibrium and sense of well-being of
individual citizens demand it."'3

20

He elaborated on his notion of "guar-

anteed right to insurance" as follows:
Guaranteeing the right to essential insurance is providing the
availability of necessary coverages on an equal basis to every
individual who meets a minimum standard of insurability,
regardless of considerations of the relative desirability of the
risk. Risks which are often perceived by the industry (rightly
or wrongly) as "undesirable" must be given the same opportunities to buy the same essential insurance coverages as
those perceived to be "desirable". Any program of mechanism which fails to guarantee the availability of all coverages
offered in these essential lines of insurance on an equal basis
to all citizens who meet the minimum standards of insurability is not sound public policy. 2 1
More specifically, the claims of right and entitlement proceed
along the following lines: Private home ownership is the preferred form
of shelter in American society. Most buyers assume mortgages to
finance the purchase of a home. Mortgages are not available if property
insurance cannot be procured to protect the mortgagee's interest. 2 2 The
tie between shelter and insurance creates an entitlement. Similarly, in
the automobile insurance context, the argument rests on the idea that
the right to travel is a fundamental one in American society. 23 The
right to drive an automobile is the keystone of that right. Lawful driving generally requires a driver's license. Once acquired, a license is
constitutionally protected property. Since use of that property is dependent upon the registration of an automobile, which is in turn dependent
upon the purchase of state-mandated insurance, 2 ' it follows that a mo319

INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, FINAL REPORT ON CONSUMER/INSURANCE INDUS-

TRY DIALOGUES 6 (1980).
320

ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 81, at 4. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 13.

ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 81, at 26. It should be noted that the former Commissioner's conception of a guaranteed right is accompanied by a goal of fair pricing which seems not
to involve subsidization. See id.
3
See id. at 4; see also supra note 10.
3" The right to automobile insurance is discussed in Shavers v. Kelly, 402 Mich; 554, 598600, 267 N.W.2d 72, 86-87 (1978). See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text; see also ESSENTIAL INSURANCE, supra note 81, at 4.
2

3"

See supra note 9.
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torist has a property right in the availability of insurance. The rights at
issue are not rights to housing and transportation per se, but to the
insurance that will enable the claimants to procure housing or
transportation.
A number of objections can be advanced against the claimants' asserted entitlements to insurance. There are an infinite number of things
that groups of people could be said to need and that society could be
required to supply under a claim of right. A short list of essential goods
and services founded upon a consensus would be advantageous, but
32 5
does not exist.
Moreover, assuming that a right exists, the question arises as to
whether it is negative or positive.3 2 If the right is a negative one, the
state may not bar applicants from procuring insurance from private
sources. If the right is positive, the state must make insurance available.
If it is extremely positive, the state must make it affordable or supply it
to persons who cannot bear the expense.32 7 The group-relief claimants
are in the somewhat anomalous position of arguing that the positive
right they already have should be upgraded to positive-plus (that is,
that available insurance should be affordable), or that the positive-plus
right that covert subsidization has created is insufficient (that is, that
the cost to the claimants should be further reduced). Once provision has
been made for supplying some quantity of a good or service to the deserving and needy, there is no formula of uniform and general application that can be invoked in arguing for an increase. The line between
too much and too little varies with the circumstances of the claimants.3 28 Absolute equality is a determinate but undesirable alternative
because it is inconsistent with the basic premises of the capitalistic welfare state. Thus, claims of right may be adequate to require some
change in a system that fails to deliver "essential insurance" to a large
number of citizens, but they cannot resolve the remaining dilemma of
scarcity and sacrifice.
Claims of economic entitlement generate opposition because when
one group gains such a right, some other group assumes an obligation
that it may prefer not to undertake. In the insurance context, the obli"* See C. FRIED, supra note 215, at 119-24.
"' For a discussion of negative and postive rights, see id. at 110-14.
" In Hawaii, welfare recipients do not have to pay for automobile insurance, which the
state requires all its drivers to purchase. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 294-24(b)(2) (Supp. 1976). See
also COIL PROC., supra note 50, at 10-11, 23 (statement of Emmett Vaughan, arguing that subsidies should be made available only to the poor, perhaps through an insurance stamp program).
3 See R. UNGER II, supra note 3, at 74; see also Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note
316, at 680-81 ("Positive rights ... pose problems largely because the reciprocity and boundedness of duties seem gravely threatened by the idea of being duty-bound to contribute actively to the
satisfaction of other people's interests or needs.").
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gation becomes that of better risks to subsidize the insurance costs of
poorer risks." 9 As the previous discussion of the individualist arguments illustrates, 8 0 this added cost is precisely what some good-risk
claimants object to so strenuously, and the rhetoric of rights and entitlements is short on justifications for such an imposition. The group-relief
arguments assume the existence of a consensus upon which a demand
might be based, without suggesting how the consensus has been
achieved and why others should be obligated to meet the demand. It
might be charged that the rhetoric of rights is antilibertarian in that it
does not confront the necessity of engaging competing claimants for
scarce resources in a dialogue so as to secure their consent to the desired distribution. 3 1 But if the group-relief claimants really had the
power to deny others the liberty to choose, they would not have to rely
on the rhetoric of rights to support their claims. Rights protect the
powerless and less powerful. The powerful do not need rights.
The consensual nature of the rhetoric of rights is useful to the
claimants because it obscures the role of politics, but it cannot negate
politics. If anything, the consensus seems to be that economic entitlements such as the claimants seek can exist only to the extent that the
political process recognizes and creates them. 3 2 The scope of the entitlement depends upon the grant or leave of the dominant political
forces. Lacking dictatorial powers, the group-relief claimants must resort to arguments that acknowledge the potential conflict of interests
over the allocation of scarce resources and persuade opposing groups to
join them in seeking to change the status quo.
2.

Social Causality

The collectivist arguments often acknowledge the existence of increased risk among the claimant groups, but explain it by advancing a
theory of social causation33 3 or "shared responsibility." ' ' The appeal is
intended to invoke an almost objective sense of the "public" interest, 3 5
I Subsidization is, of course, debated within the insurance controversy. See supranotes 30304 and accompanying text.
o See supra text accompanying notes 207-99.
£31 The criticism assumes that real consent can be obtained in a liberal democratic state. For
an opposing perspective, see C. PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1979).
ss See, e.g., Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 316, at 684-85.
**' See T. HASKELL, supra note 261, at 252-56, on the origins of social causation as an area
of sociological inquiry.
See, e.g., N.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 85-87.
s' See Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: CompetingJudicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 149-52 (1977-1978). There are
conflicting views concerning the nature of a public interest that is more than a coalescence of
subjective interests. Compare, e.g., Barry, The Public Interest, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 159,
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consisting of an altruistic concern for the welfare of others."3 ' The
group-relief claimants present themselves as victims of conditions over
which they have little control and offer a perspective that looks beyond
themselves in seeking an explanation for their situation."' For example, they argue that males have more accidents because they are socialized to exhibit aggressive, adventuresome behavior behind the wheel. 38
Urbanites have more accidents because their streets are clogged by suburban commuters who cannot be turned back at the limits of the city. 3 9
The social environment, then, is held accountable for a group's low
status as insurable risks and for the group's limited ability to alter its
circumstances. This explanation for their low status also serves as an
objective rationale for the group's common pursuit of relief." 0
With respect to redlined neighborhoods, the group-relief arguments pointedly assert that insurance companies share the responsibility for deteriorating conditions. Residents of redlined neighborhoods
contend that luck and individual initiative do not alone determine who
lives where; social domination of some groups by others plays a role.
Banks, realtor associations, and insurance companies impel housing
patterns." 1 Moreover, insurance companies have enormous sums available for investment in housing and community development, but they
have steered clear of urban projects. By withholding insurance coverage
and investment monies, insurance companies are impeding the efforts of
173-77 (W. Connolly ed. 1969) (identifying the public interest with what each person would deem
best for himself and everyone else because all are affected equally) with Benditt, The Public
Interest, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 291 (1973) (defining an act in the public interest as one that
promotes an interest of the public, i.e., an interest of anyone) and J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND AD.
VERSARY DEMOCRACY 24-28 (1980) (predicating common interests on group and individual altruism). But see R. UNGER II, supra note 3 at 76-81, 238-40. According to Unger, in the classical
conception, "[o]bjective values are standards and goals of conduct that exist independently of
human choice." Id. at 76. They arise out of "eternal moral laws that inhere in the nature of
things." Id. at 240. Unger argues that the theory of objective values is untenable because it "presupposes that the mind can grasp and establish moral essences or goods," an assumption that has
never been proven. Moreover, "the doctrine denies any significance to choice other than the passive
acceptance or rejection of independent truths." Id. at 77. See also id. at 238-39. He suggests that
what may appear to be objective values are merely a convergence of subjective interests. Id. at 7879.
us Duncan Kennedy posits the ideal of altruism as the antithesis of the ideal of individualism. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1717-22. "The essence of altruism is the belief that one ought not
to indulge a sharp preference for one's own interest over those of others. Altruism enjoins us to
make sacrifices, to share, and to be merciful." Id. at 1717 (emphasis in original).
337 See Squires, supra note 303, at 79-80.
3" See Shayer, supra note 184, at 10.
a Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 164-65.
34 See generally Balbus, The Concept of Interest in Pluralistand Marxian Analysis, 1 POL.
& SOC'Y 151 (1971). Balbus defines an objective interest as "an effect by something on the individual which can be observed and measured by standards external to the individual's consciousness."
Id. at 152. He argues that a theory of pure subjective interest cannot account for the group formation that leads to political change.
34 Squires, supra note 303, at 79-80, 85.
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low-status communities to increase their habitablity and desirability.""2
To relieve the burdens imposed on them by society, the residents demand subsidies and a species of domestic aid to underdeveloped
communities.3 4s
Even if social domination is acknowledged, and it is agreed that
the financial hardship of the group-relief claimants must be reallocated
or shared, altruism alone provides no basis for resolving the problem.
There must be some scheme for spreading the cost among the remaining groups, 44 and it is not easy to separate the victims from the villians.3 45 For example, if sex is abolished as a rating criterion for automobile insurance, young men will pay less and young women will pay
more.," Because of social circumstances, young women are generally
poorer than their male counterparts and are still limited by the restrictions that account for their lesser accident involvement. Women do not
drive at night, not because of their cumulative preferences, but because
women justifiably believe that they are not safe alone on the streets or
in cars after dark. The adverse effect on women that would result from
abandoning sex as a rating criterion should therefore be offset by juggling some other criterion. Other groups burdened by the changes will
then invoke some theory of social domination which makes them victims, too. There is a collision of subjectively conceived interests. Every
group believes itself deserving of altruistic relief and sees itself as powerless to determine its own fate, let alone the fate of some other group.
Power may exist, but its locus cannot be determined. Thus, no group
feels obliged to yield, as all have already been overpowered. Because
appeals to altruism must confront this obstacle, group-relief claimants
cannot construct a scheme, acceptable to all groups, that factors social
causality into insurance rates.
Arguments for redistributing insurance protection and its costs in
accord with principles of social responsibility and altruism are weakened by the absence of a shared basis for giving deference to the interests of one group at the expense of the interests of another. Indeed, the
-' Squires, supra note 303, at 91-92. But cf FULL INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 22-24
(portraying insurance companies as merely responding to independent socioeconomic
developments).
" See, e.g., Shepard, A New Urban Partnership,in DIRECTIONS, supra note 318, at 1-4.
314 See T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 133-42 (1970).
45 Cf. J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 38-39 (1973) (postwar capitalism has spread
effects of averted economic crisis over a broad range of groups, fragmenting class consciousness and
making "(almost) everyone at the same time both a participant and a victim").
46 See Strong Opposition to Gender Elimination as Auto InsuranceRating FactorRaised by
NAIl, INS. ADVOC., Feb. 27, 1982, at 8. The New Jersey legislature found that eliminating gender as a rating factor for auto insurance would increase the price of auto insurance for young
women by 46% and decrease premiums for young men by only 16%.
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prevailing theory is that the interests of every individual in every group
347
are entitled to equal weight in the determination of public policy.
The point may br summarized as follows:
Interests belong to the individual, not the community. Accordingly, political society depends for its purpose on the
sum of the interests of its members. As a mechanical contrivance whose authority is based on consent, it has no independent interest to impart to its members higher than their
own conflicting antecedent interests. Nor, given the inviolable status of each member's interests, can the polity use the
interests of some to define the proper content of the public
34 8
order and judge all interests by it.
3.

Externalized Costs of Benefits

In the scheme of pluralistic politics, group interests are added, not
shared, and the total determines the course chosen. Claimants must
therefore cultivate other groups with whom they might jointly demand
reform.3 ' Moreover, those groups that are to assume an added obligation must be convinced that they are not really losers but gainers; they
must agree that it is in their own best interests to grant the relief the
claimants seek.35 0 To add their interests to those of the claimants, the
subsidizing groups must be persuaded that they are receiving a quid
pro quo for their subsidies. 51 Thus, a subsidized personal insurance
program must either benefit the classes of better risks directly or protect
them from the potentially greater future demands that can be made
upon them through other social programs." 2
Partially subsidized first-person no-fault automobile coverage, for
instance, is offered to bad risks so that other forms of insurance-private or social-will not bear the cost attributable to the inD. BASKIN, supra note 311, at 74; J. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 335, at 17.
,"8 D. BASKIN, supra note 311, at 72.
Cf .FCummings, What Goes Around, Comes Around, in DIRECTIONS, supra note 318, at
10 (regretting that redlining, a problem long plaguing blacks, received attention when it affected
white communities).
3" Cf Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 518 (1980) (the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality is accommodated only when
it converges with that of whites).
351 These benefits are referred to as "externalities." See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 11,
at 12; Mass. Opinion, supra note 177, at 164. Economic externality analysis, despite its suggestion
of scientific neutrality, is simply covert political argumentation. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 398-400 (1981).
352 See Musgrave, The Role of Social Insurance in an Overall Program for Social Welfare,
in The Princeton Symposium on the American System of Social Insurance 23 (W. Bowen, F.
Harbison, R. Lester & H. Sommers eds. 1968). Cf. Michelman, supra note 335, at 154-57 (giving
two "individualistic economic" rationales for acceptance of the welfare state).
347
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sured activity. Likewise, third-person automobile liability coverage protects the vast pool of potential victims. The payout depends upon the
damages suffered by the injured party. Affluent victims are more likely
to incur higher medical costs and lost wages than are poor victims for
an identical injury. 53 Because affluent victims are likely to reap a
larger recovery from a liability insurance fund, the argument runs, it is
appropriate that they subsidize the insurance purchased by poorer
folks. 3 "
An appeal to the self-interests of other groups may involve a demonstration of the potential to affect them adversely if change is not
forthcoming. The extent of the relief thereby secured depends on the
extent to which the claimants jeopardize the interests of others. "5 The
use of disruptive tactics as a component of the strategy of the grouprelief claimants illustrates this point. Confrontation has been used by
activists attacking redlining practices as a device to get insurance companies to the negotiating tables. A tract on conducting anti-rediining
campaigns instructs that negotiations should be undertaken only after a
demonstration of power that shows the targeted carrier that it is "better
to negotiate now than to wait for [an] invasion of its annual meeting."3 56 When State Farm Insurance Company did not negotiate in
Cleveland, Ohio, the Buckeye Community Congress sent busloads of
angry insureds to the regional vice president's suburban home; in Chicago, the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance had- a busload of consumers invade the office of the president of State Farm.3 57 According to
the tract, the attention of the media should be captured by "identify[ing], isolat[ing], and personalizing the enemy." 3 8 To keep negotiations going and to thwart violation of any agreement, confrontation
should continue with a second insurer, in order to remind the first company of the omnipresent threat.3 5
Despite all this, the effort to obtain relief based on a compounding
of interests is doomed. Benefits that further the interests of the subsidizers do not necessarily improve the lot of the subsidized groups that are,
in fact, seeking the elimination of oppressive treatment. For example,
Hawaiian drivers who receive public assistance "are provided with free
liability insurance which they really do not need (but for the requireN.J. REPORT, supra note 67, at 85.
"

Leatherbury, No-FaultAutomobile Insurance: Will the PoorPay More Again?, 26 CASE

W. RES. L. REV. 101, 142-43 (1975).

' See Offe, PoliticalAuthority and Class Structures-An Analysis of Late CapitalistSoDcties, 2 INT'L J. SOC. 73, 87-89 (1972).
s" R. SCHACHTER, supra note 31, at 68.
=" Id. at 66.
3
Id& at 105.
" Id. at 80.
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ments of compulsory insurance laws) since they have few assets to protect. They are not provided with free or low cost physical damage insurance which is the only coverage they really need,"3 ' and which is
likely to be required in order to obtain financing for the purchase of a
car.3 61 Although the subsidies provide protection for accident victims,
they do not alter the system of discriminatory pricing that makes the
insurance the low-income driver might like to purchase so costly. 62
Relief that is motivated by the self-interest of the more powerful
will eventually prove to be a source of frustration for the group-relief
claimants, because it will not alter the unequal allocation of power,
wealth, and prestige that is the real source of the conflict. Consequently, the acceptability of any resolution of the conflict generated by
their claims is undermined as it is being achieved. The impossibility of
securing change through real consensus untainted by the manifestations
of hierarchy and domination is demoralizing-indeed, politics in the
liberal welfare society is demoralizing.
The theory of interest-group pluralism does not deal adequately
with expressed interests and demands for change because it disregards
the allocation of power and the engineering of authority."' The theory
is essentially conservative in that it protects the status quo. Interestgroup politics is a function, not the source, of social order.$" Because
the outright suppression or rejection of an articulated demand for reform could threaten the legitimacy of the power structure (be it the
public or private component), there must be a response to the demand
that will be considered authoritative-that is, one to be respected without an independent assessment of its justification." 5 The decisions that
emerge from the conflict of pluralistic interests are authoritative only
because a consensus exists about the process. 6 6 Roberto Unger calls
this concensus the association of interests: "The basic premise of the
association of interests is that men will abide by relatively stable standards of interaction because they believe it to be to their mutual advantage to do so rather than because they participate in an identical vision
360 J.

Sheldon & E. Sarason, supra note 29, at 83 (emphasis in original).
"1 J. Sheldon & E. Sarason, The Impact of Automobile Insurance Practices on Legal Services Eligible Clients 54 (May 1979) (available through Research Institute on Legal Assistance,
Legal Services Corp.).
362 Id. at 88.
'" Much attention has been given to the fact that interest-group pluralism does not work
because suppressed and unexpressed interests are not considered in the calculus. See, e.g., S.
LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974); Balbus, supra note 340, at 151; Parker, The Past of
Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 242-46 (1981).
3
D. BASKIN, supra note 311, at 136.
"5 See Austin, supra note 306, at 1513-14.
3" See D. BASKIN, supra note 311, at 130-32; see also R. WOLFF, supra note 313, at 160.
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of the truth and the good."3817 Yet a polity based on such an association

of interests is "precarious;" 8 s as another commentator has
is an "acute preoccupation with order and equilibrium." 6
that order can be achieved through a balancing of interests
nied by an anxiety "about impending chaos and disorder

noted, there
Confidence
is accompainspired by

• . .[an] acute awareness of conflict, competition and energetic exertion

incident to an egalitarian society."13 70 Conflict is chronic, and as illustrated by the analysis of the supposedly neutral criteria invoked by the
individualist mode of argument,3 71 consensus is illusive. Authority and
legitimacy are always at stake. Any political solution to the controversy
predicated on the arguments analyzed above will be unsatisfactory and
short-lived.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The arguments analyzed in this Article are the tools of individuals
and groups attemping to free themselves from the oppressive consequences of a variant of social stratification practiced by private insurance companies. Arguments aimed at the achievement of such liberation
should, of course, be pressed so long as they produce results. When
they fail and their useful lives are over, however, new ones must be
found. The object of this Article is to demonstrate the weaknesses of the
arguments currently being advanced against the insurance classification
system with limited success, and to suggest that energies might be directed toward the creation of an alternative arsenal.
The insurance classification controversy cannot be resolved by an
appeal to neutral, apolitical principles predicated upon the impossible
achievement of individual autonomy and essentially private decisionmaking. Even with supposedly neutral criteria, such as accuracy, causation, and merit, value judgments are unavoidable, and there is no
consensus of values upon which the controversy may be stilled. In order
to resolve the controversy, the private decisionmaking sanctioned by the
individualist arguments must be abandoned in favor of politics.
The collectivist arguments advanced in the controversy do acknowledge the primacy of politics, but these arguments, too, ultimately
founder. While politics may produce a solution to the controversy, that
solution is bound to be unsatisfactory as long as political outcomes are
predicated on an interest-group pluralism that tends to preserve the sta3'8R. UNGER I, supra note 3, at 144-45.

3" R. UNGER II, supra note 3, at 78.
36,D. BASKIN, supra note 311, at 141.
370
371

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 207-99.
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tus quo and does not alter the allocation of power or the pursuit of selfinterest. Every political solution is suspect because it does not, and cannot, represent a consensus judgment as to what the common good
requires.
It should not be forgotten that the source of the classification controversy is the alienation and conflict that are generated when people
are unable to leave groups that have become too confining and to participate in groups that are deeply involving. The ultimate solution to
the controversy must therefore lie in the achievement of real voluntary
groups or communities whose members are engaged in important economic and social tasks relevant to the control of risks and the provision
of support and resources for the victims of accidents and losses. These
activities must be undertaken pursuant to a genuine consensus of values
that evolves through face-to-face political communication and interaction untainted by domination."'
This solution requires far-reaching changes in the structure of economics, politics, kinship, and community. 78 In the meantime, attention
can be focused on the creation of insuring institutions that (1) foster the
integration of individuals and groups which, under generally accepted
status distinctions, would be segregated and removed from one another,
and (2) provide the opportunity for the practice of a brand of politics
that is not oriented solely around the pursuit of self-interest. Integration in general should ameliorate the controversy, since insurance classifications reflect society's stratification patterns. The development of a
politics that determines how many resources should be set aside as insurance against forseeable contingencies, and how or from whom these
resources should be amassed, will give people experience in running
their own lives. Such political decisionmaking could then be extended to
other areas.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to develop more concrete proposals for legal and political reform. Some of the relief against insurance classifications that is currently being pursued, particularly that requiring more nearly identical treatment of various status groups, should
" The solution lies in the theory and practice of what Roberto Unger calls "organic
groups." R. UNGER II, supra note 3, at 236-95. In an organic group, the tension between individualism and collectivism is resolved; individuality and communality complement one another. Id. at
262. The organic group is "characterized by face-to-face co-existence and by multipurpose organization." Id. Multipurpose organization permits the individual to be viewed as more than a performer of a specialized role. He can be known as a unified personality. Id. at 262-63. Because the
spectrum of interaction is broad, "there will be. .. [a] basis of common experience upon which
common ends might develop." Id. at 263. Furthermore, decisions concerning resource allocation
are considered political and collective. Id. at 263. The individual is entitled to leave and enter
groups as he chooses. Id. at 279-80.
378 See generally M. ALBERT & R. HAHNEL, SOCIALISM TODAY AND TOMORROW (1981).
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foster social integration.87 ' Municipal fire or property insurance, a concept that is not new, is the most radical alternative to the present system that has been proposed so far.175 A number of California localities
are experimenting with a program whereby they will market group
homeowners insurance to residents through a master policy procured
from private carriers. 76 The locality-marketed product should cost less
because coverage will be limited to dwellings that pass the safety and
maintenance inspections to be conducted by fire fighting personnel
without fires to fight.87 7 According to William Hanna, a consultant:
For the homeowner there will be a chance for a lower insurance premium when the municipality is able to impose a
high standard of dwelling maintenance. For the municipality
there will be the prospect of better utilization of fire fighting
personnel and the chance to participate in some of the profits
of the insuring endeavor. .... 378
The proposal's viability, however, is said to depend on the nonprofit equivalent of risk selection. A program that largely serves the
worse risks would not be financially sound, 7 9 researchers say, and solidity can only be assured if all residents in the community are required
to purchase insurance from the locality.Y1 0 One visionary exponent of
community-based insurance also suggests that "[p]rofessional risk-management experts will be needed. Legal and marketing assistance will be
essential." 38 1
37" See supra notes 47-90 and accompanying text.
375

See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 42, at 53-55; Squires, Community Self-

Insurance, PROGREsSIVE, Dec. 1979, at 47, 49. In his article, The City as a Legal Concept, Professor Frug suggests that cities might undertake insuring activities, Frug, supra note 3, at 1128,
1150, in order to exercise a real power that is a necessary predicate to their residents' realizing
"'public freedom'-the ability to participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's
life." Id. at 1068. "IT]he need for the individual to gain control over these portions of his life now
determined by others" could be satisfied by "popular involvement in the decisionmaking process"
of small-scale entities possessing decentralized power. Id. at 1069. If cities undertook insuring
activities, decisions concerning the allocation of protection and premiums could be politicized so as
to be directly determined by an electorate small enough and intimate enough to have personal
knowledge of the risks involved and personal opinions of how the burden they impose on the
community should be distributed.
376 McLean, Big Name Insurers Tied to Group Homeowners Move, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
(Prop. & Casualty Ins. ed.), June 4, 1982, at 2, col. 2. The group marketing programs are an
outgrowth of an assessment of the feasibility of various plans of municipal insurance, including
one providing for the direct supplying of insurance by the locality to its residents. 1 Mission
Research Corp., Municipal Fire Insurance Feasibility Analysis (Oct. 24, 1980) (prepared for Institute for Local Self Government, Berkeley, Cal.).
8" McLean, supra note 376, at col. 3.
378 Id. at col. 4.
37, 1 Mission Research Corp., supra note 376, at 3-27.
"0 See id. at 3-29.
3"1 Squires, supra note 375, at 49.
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These proposed reforms are heading in the right direction in that
they involve a measure of social destratification and political decisionmaking by the persons affected. Even if adopted, they will not entirely
eliminate the alienation and conflict that are the sources of the classification controversy. Any argument or reform that is not directed at the
realization of a society composed of voluntary groups practicing participatory democracy will and must be found wanting and inadequate,
sooner or later. Such is the failing of the arguments this Article has
explored.

